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THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REPORTING KNOWN AND
SUSPECTED CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT*
DOUGLAS J. BESHAROVt
I.

INTRODUCTION

APPROXIMATELY ONE MILLION CHILDREN ARE MALTREATED by their parents each year. Of these children, as many as
100,000 to 200,000 are physically abused, 60,000 to 100,000 are
sexually abused, and the remainder are neglected. Each year, more
than 2,000 children die in circumstances suggestive of abuse or
neglect.1
Accounts of child maltreatment can be found throughout
recorded history. 2 Although concern over the needs of children and
families in personal and social distress developed slowly during the
eighteenth century, concerted efforts to protect abused and neglected
children did not occur until late in the nineteenth century. The
creation of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children (SPCC) in 1875 - and its legal recognition through state
legislation in the same year 3 - are major milestones in society's
efforts to remedy the plight of abused and neglected children. Since
then, an expanding number of SPCCs, local police agencies, and a
developing network of public welfare agencies have shared and
divided the responsibility to receive and investigate reports of known
and suspected child abuse and neglect.
But until recently, child abuse and child neglect were hidden
problems, relegated to understaffed and overwhelmed agencies far
from public view. Neither the true seriousness of child maltreatment
nor the urgent need to implement effective societal responses was
widely recognized. It was only in the 1960's that the plight of
"battered" and "maltreated" children was first brought to public
Copyright 1978, Douglas J. Besharov.
Director, National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. B.A., Queens College, 1968; L.L.M., New York University,
1971. Author, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY (1974).
This article was prepared with the assistance of Mr. Jos6 Alfaro and Howard
Goldman, Esquire. The statutory citations are as of April 30, 1977 and are derived
from the computerized legal data base of the United States National Center on Child
Abuse and Neglect. The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the
position or policy of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and no official
endorsement by the Department should be inferred.
*

1. U.S. NAT'L CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPS. 7 (Feb. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CENTER REPORT].
2. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 452 cited in McCoid, The

Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1 n.1 (1965).

3. See An Act for the Incorporation of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, ch. 130, 1875 N.Y. LAWS 114.
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attention, largely through the efforts of three physicians, Doctors C.
Henry Kempe, Ray Helfer, and Vincent J. Fontana.4 By 1967, every
state had enacted legislation requiring physicians to report child
abuse. 5
However, such reporting laws are only one step toward
protecting endangered children. 6 By 1970, most child protective
systems had grown into patchwork systems of blurred responsibility,
often based on vague and superficial considerations. Responsibility
was frequently passed from one agency or individual to another;
continuous referrals caused frequent loss of information and delays
in providing services. The inability of existing agencies to protect
endangered children was widely admitted. Studies found that
children suffered further injury or died after a report was made to
the authorities because of administrative breakdowns among
"balkanized" agencies. 7 In response to growing public and professional awareness that existing child protective procedures needed to
be strengthened and upgraded,8 states began to reform their child
protective systems as well as their child abuse reporting laws. As
part of this broadening concern, the United States Congress passed
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974 (Federal
Act). 9 The Federal Act's eligibility criteria for grants to states to help
improve their child abuse and neglect services reflect the evolution
toward more extensive and detailed child protective laws. Section
4(b)(2) of the Act provides, in part:
(2) In order for a State to qualify for assistance under this
subsection, such State shall(A) have in effect a State child abuse and neglect law
which shall include provisions for immunity for persons
reporting instances of child abuse and neglect from
prosecution, under any State or local law, arising out of such
reporting;
4. See THE BATTERED CHILD (R. Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1968) [hereinafter cited
as THE BATTERED CHILD]; V. FONTANA, THE MALTREATED CHILD (1964).

5. See generally V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE
1970's 6 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as DEFRANCIS & LUCHT]; Paulsen, The Legal
Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 711 (1966).
6. See notes 216-218 and accompanying text infra.
7. See, e.g., NEw YORK STATE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMM. ON CHILD ABUSE
REPORT 8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP.] reprinted in THE
BATTERED CHILD 229 (2d ed. R. Helfer & C. Kempe eds. 1974).
8. See Foster & Freed, Battered Child Legislation and ProfessionalImmunity, 52
A.B.A.J. 1071, 1073 (1966).
9. Act of Jan. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 5 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§5101-5106 (Supp. V 1975)). The Federal Act authorized the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare to establish the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect
as a clearinghouse for information and research. Id. §5101. The statute also
authorizes grants to states to help improve their child protective services. Id. § 5103.
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(B) provide for the reporting of known and suspected
instances of child abuse and neglect;
(C) provide that upon receipt of a report of known or
suspected instances of child abuse or neglect an investigation shall be initiated promptly to substantiate the accuracy
of the report, and, upon a finding of abuse or neglect,
immediate steps shall be taken to protect the health and
welfare of the abused or neglected child, as well as that of
any other child under the same care who may be in danger
of abuse or neglect;
(D) demonstrate that there are in effect throughout the
State, in connection with the enforcement of child abuse and
neglect laws and with the reporting of suspected instances of
child abuse and neglect, such administrative procedures,
such personnel trained in child abuse and neglect prevention
and treatment, such training procedures, such institutional
and other facilities (public and private), and such related
multidisciplinary programs and services as may be necessary or appropriate to assure that the State will deal
effectively with child abuse and neglect cases in the State;
(E) provide for methods to preserve the confidentiality
of all records in order to protect the rights of the child, his
parents or guardians;
(G) provide that in every case involving an abused or
neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding a
guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the child
in such proceedings. 10
In part because of the impetus of the Federal Act, but more
importantly because of public and professional demands for
improved child protective systems, at least forty-two states have
recently amended their laws and procedures: to require the reporting
of suspected neglect as well as abuse; to prescribe procedures for
investigations and other aspects of case handling - often a
specialized child protective agency is designated or established;1 ' to
provide a guardian ad litem for the child; to upgrade central
registers of reports; to ensure confidentiality of records; to require
independent investigations of institutional child maltreatment; and
to mandate professional training and public education efforts. This
"second generation" of state child protective laws demonstrates "an
10. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
11. See notes 217 & 219 and accompanying text infra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 4

1977-1978]

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

increased public concern about child abuse and neglect, and a
continually rising level of sophistication in the public response to
12
that problem.'
This article examines these "second generation" child protective
laws.
II.

PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

A report of known or suspected child abuse or neglect sets in
motion an unavoidably stressful investigation which may lead to the
removal of a child from his home and the stigmatization of a family
within its community. The benign purposes and rehabilitative
services of child protective agencies do not prevent them from being
unpleasant and sometimes destructive - though well-meaning coercive intrusions into family life.
Implicit in most recent child protective legislation is the
legislative finding that the balance between children's rights and
parents' rights must be weighted in favor of protecting children. Yet,
it is important to protect traditional American values of freedom and
legality while trying to protect endangered children. If society is to
intrude into family life without the free consent of parents, it must
do so with due regard to parental rights, as well as to the needs of
children. Thus, even though the experience of all states shows that
only a handful of reports are not made in good faith, 13 as states seek
to improve and upgrade their child protective systems generally,
they should also seek to improve the provisions they make to protect
the rights of all involved. Legal safeguards can be provided to
protect parental rights without unreasonably endangering children.' 4 State law should accord to both the child and the parent the
full safeguards of fundamental fairness, confidentiality, and due
process of law. Coercive intervention into family life should not be
authorized unless there is sufficient reason to believe that child
abuse and child neglect exist.'5 Moreover, these terms should be
carefully defined in state law to minimize their improper application
to situations where societal intervention is not justified. 16 All records
should be kept confidential 17 to protect both parents and children
12. G.

DAHL, TRENDS

IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT REPORTING STATUTES

2

(publication of Educ. Comm. for the States, Rep. No. 95, 1977).
13. Data on file at the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C.
14. In particular, parents should have the legal safeguards of confidentiality of

records, right to inspect records and to challenge their contents as well as the right to
counsel. See notes 242-51, 257-69, 277-79 & 297-300 and accompanying text infra.
15. See also notes 254 & 255 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 84-100 and accompanying text infra.
17. See note 257 and accompanying text infra.
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and should be made available only in clearly defined situations.18
Furthermore, treatment services should be offered first on a
voluntary basis. 19 The child protective agency should resort to court
action only if necessary, and when the powers of the court must
be invoked to protect the child, a civil proceeding in a juvenile or
family court should be sought in preference to criminal court
action.2° If a case reaches court, both the child and the parents
21
should have independent legal counsel.
III. PROVISIONS FOR SELF-HELP AND VOLUNTARILY
SOUGHT SERVICES

In our society, parents have the prime responsibility of caring
for their children. 22 Unless a child's health or welfare is endangered,
the family's right to privacy and right to be left alone are well
23
established.
Encouraging parents to seek help on their own is the most
humanitarian, practical, and the least intrusive approach to
preventing child abuse and neglect, because helping services are
most effective when they are accepted voluntarily. If parents who
need help understand their need, they will seek help on their own
and will be more willing to accept it when it is offered to them.
Moreover, self-help may be the only way to reach large numbers of
families who would otherwise not receive help. Because large
numbers of cases are never recognized or reported, many situations
of abuse and neglect become known only when family members seek
outside assistance.
Unfortunately, America's traditional and fundamental reliance
on self-help for personal problems and voluntarily accepted social
services is being undermined by the continuing expansion of child

18, See notes 262-69 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 23-31 and accompanying text infra.
20. Although referral to criminal court may be appropriate in certain situations,

the criminal court can protect the child only by jailing the abusive parent. See
Paulsen, supra note 5, at 680-93. The juvenile court, on the other hand, can help
mobilize social and psychological services necessary to deal with some of the
fundamental problems that led to the abuse. See id. at 693-703; text accompanying
note 208 infra.
21. See notes 288-300 and accompanying text infra.
22. Moreover, "physical discipline is considered part of the parent's right and
duty to nurture his child." Dembitz, Child Abuse and the Law - Fact and Fiction,24
REC. N.Y. CITY B.A. 613, 620 (1969). See also Paulsen, supra note 5, at 686-88.
23. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (recognizing that
the marriage relationship lies "within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional grounds"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.. 510, 534
(1925) (recognizing the right of parents to choose how their children shall be
educated).
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protective systems. 2 4 When elaborate organizational structures are

developed to institutionalize the provision of involuntary care and
support, the importance of informal, and voluntary, services is easily
forgotten.
The need to encourage parents to seek help on their own is only
now being addressed by state child protective laws and procedures.
Until recently, states sensitive to the need to encourage or protect
parental efforts for self-help have reacted by refusing to extend the
reach of reporting laws, usually by restricting mandatory reporting
to situations of serious physical abuse or by limiting those who must
report to a selected group of professionals. 25 But today, more positive
approaches are being used: by staffing the reporting hotline with
social workers who can direct parents to the services that seem most
appropriate, a number of states are ensuring that their reporting
systems can provide an informed and sensitive response to parents
who ask for help. 26 There is also a discernible movement to enhance
the parents' right to understand the child protective process, by
informing them that a report has been made, 27 that the report may
be amended or expunged, 28 that the purpose of the investigation is to
protect endangered children and provide needed services, that
services may be refused, 29 and that the effect of refusing services
may be referral to court. 30
A commitment to voluntarily-sought helping services should
permeate a state's formal and informal child protective system. The
years ahead should see greater elaboration of such efforts, as states
seek to ensure that families receive the most appropriate services
31
possible with a minimum of state intrusion.

24. Even the offer of help by child protective agencies to parents, presented in the
context of the expressed or implied possibility of court action may be seen as coercive

and, therefore, not really voluntary. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 708.
25. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit., 11 §2204 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) (limiting
mandatory reporting to situations of "serious physical or mental injury").
26. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145(1) (Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.6(C) (Cum.
Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-5 (Supp. 1977).
27. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(6) (McKinney 1976).
28. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-818(A)(8) (Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-10-114(8) (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.19(2) (West Supp. 1975); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.627(2) (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.165(c) (West 1977);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §422(8) (McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §2215(d)
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1356(d) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
29. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-111(4) (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235A.5(8) (West Supp. 1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(9) (McKinney 1976); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2217(8) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
30. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2217(9) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
31. See, e.g., note 130 and accompanying text infra (provisions to waive full child
protective investigation).
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REPORTING OF KNOWN AND SUSPECTED CHILD

ABUSE AND NEGLECT

A. Purpose
Because helping services are most effective when they are
voluntarily sought, all communities encourage parents facing an
abuse or neglect situation to seek help in meeting their child care
responsibilities. But if parents do not seek help on their own, the
responsibility to take protective action falls on others. When a child
is endangered, American society is unwilling to rely solely on
parents seeking help. Adults who are attacked or otherwise wronged
can go to the authorities for protection and redress of their
grievances. But the victims of child abuse and neglect are usually
too young or too frightened to obtain protection for themselves.
Protection for these helpless children is often possible only when a
third person - a friend, a neighbor, a relative, or a professional recognizes the child's danger and reports it to the proper authorities.
Reporting begins the child protective process. If a case of suspected
child abuse or neglect is not reported, neither the police nor a child
protective agency can become involved, emergency protective
measures cannot be taken, and a treatment plan cannot be
developed. Reflecting the preeminence of reporting in an adequately
functioning child protective system, the Federal Act, as a prerequisite for special funding, requires that states "provide for the
reporting of known and suspected instances of child abuse or
32
neglect."
The purpose of reporting is to foster the protection of children not to punish those who maltreat them. Hence, child protective laws
have no provisions for criminal court prosecution because, in most
situations, criminal intent is absent. 33 While criminal prosecution
may be appropriate in certain situations, particularly when the child
has died or has been severely harmed, or when the child has been
abused while in an institution, such cases are dealt with in child
protective laws only to the extent of recognizing that they should be
referred for or coordinated with a criminal prosecution. 34
B. Mandatory Reporting
Unfortunately, many professionals and private citizens fail to
report situations suggestive of child abuse or child neglect, thus
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
33. Which is not to say that technical elements of mens rea are not present. See
generally text accompanying note 208 infra.
34. Cf. MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT §§ 7, 16(1), (m), (n), (o) (Aug. 1977 draft).
See note 129 infra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 4
1977-1978]

CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT

subjecting many children to continued suffering and sometimes
permanent harm and even death. In 1971, George Wyman, then
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services,
explained the reasons for underreporting in New York state. They
are applicable to all states.
Although many persons will casually accept the possibility that
some children may be subjected to abuse, it appears that only
the tragedy of death or severe maiming of a child in one's own
community with its ensuing publicity and notoriety provides the
stimulus for reporting the suspected abuse of other children.
Other factors would seem to be: more restrictive definitions
being applied [in some areas of the state], i.e., the tendency to
report abuse only when injury is severe; diagnostic capabilities
not sufficiently well-developed, particularly in areas where
medical centers are not involved; reluctance to become involved
due to fear of criminal prosecution of parents or automatic
removal of children, more personal relationship with one's
neighbors in rural communities mitigates against being willing
to speak out even though this will protect a child; frustration
that reports have not in fact resulted in the desired goals, i.e.,
rehabilitation treatment for the child and family, or successful
adjudication in Family Court; lack of organized, vigorous
35
program of casefinding and interpretation.
The failure of many professionals to report child abuse and
neglect has led all fifty states to pass laws requiring certain
professionals or all citizens to report known and suspected child
36
abuse and neglect.
35. N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 28 (remarks of Comm'r Wyman,
Oct. 5, 1971).
36. The following 45 states and the District of Columbia, Guam, and Puerto Rico
require designated professionals to report: ALA. CODE tit. 27, §21 (Supp. 1975);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.020, .070(6) (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-362.A (Supp. 1977);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (Cum. Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (West
Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1976); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (West Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 903 (Cum. Supp. 1976);
D.C. CODE § 2-162 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(4) (West 1976); GA. CODE ANN.

§74-111(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §350-1 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE
§ 16-1619 (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977);
IOWA CODE ANN. §§235A.2(4), .3(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. §38-717
(Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(C)(1)
(West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 35A(b)(1), (4), (5), (c) (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1976)
(repealing ch. 119, § 39A (1969)); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.623(1) (Supp. 1977);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3) (West Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-9 (Cum.
Supp. 1977) (amending § 43-23-9 (1972)); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.115(1), (2) (Supp. 1976);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10- 1304 (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1502
(1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2) (1973), as amended by § 202.502 (1975); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169:40 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1(A) (1976); N.Y. Soc.
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The appearance of mandatory reporting laws is a relatively
recent phenomenon. The United States Children's Bureau first
proposed a model reporting law in 1963. 37 In "the span of four
legislative years all 50 states enacted [such] laws seeking reports of
injuries inflicted on children. 38s Dean Paulsen comments: "In the
history of the United States, few legislative proposals have been so
widely adopted in so little time." 9
Mandatory reporting laws seek to encourage fuller reporting of
known and suspected child abuse and neglect: 1) by requiring certain
professionals to report their reasonable suspicions of child abuse or
neglect;4 0 2) by providing immunity from liability for those reporting
in good faith;4 ' 3) by providing penalties for failure to report as
required by law;42 4) by providing a convenient and easily useable

reporting system; 43 5) by identifying effective investigative and
44
treatment services.
The medical profession was the first, and remains the foremost,
target of reporting statutes. 45 Doctors are considered the profession-

LAw § 413 (McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-117(5), -118(a) (1975); N.D.
CODE §50-25.1-03(1) (Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421 (Page
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846(A) (Supp. West 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2204 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§40-11-6 (Supp. 1976); S.C. CODE ANN. §20-9-20(a) (1976) (repealed 1977); S.D.
COMPILED LAws ANN. § 26-10-10 (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1353(a) (Cum. Supp.
1977); VA. CODE §63.1-248.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.020(3), (7)-(10), .030(1) (Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.8 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); GUAM PENAL CODE § 273(d) (Supp. 1974); P. R. LAws ANN. tit. 3, § 211M
(Supp. 1977); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 172 (Supp. 1975), as amended by (1976 Act No.
3825, Eleventh Legislature, § 1). The following five states require "any person" to
report, which would include all professionals: IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1976); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §9:6-8.10 (West 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1203 (1977); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.01 (Vernon 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-2 (Supp. 1977).
SERV.
CENT.
1976);
(1975);

37. U.S. CHILDREN BUREAU, THE ABUSED CHILD - PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED
LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD
(1963).
38. DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5, at 6.
39. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 711.
40. See notes 45-67 and accompanying text infra.
41. See notes 103-13 and accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 131-50 and accompanying text infra.
43. See notes 180-90 and accompanying text infra.
44. See notes 194-204 and accompanying text infra.
45. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(4) (West
1976); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3852(1) (Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.115(1) (Supp.
1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421 (Page 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §2024
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (West. Cum. Supp. 1977).
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als most likely to see injured children, and they are presumed most
qualified to diagnose the symptoms of abuse and neglect. 46 The early
focus on physicians quickly widened to include most other profes49
sionals in the "healing arts," 47 such as nurses, 48 osteopaths,
5°
51
52
53
podiatrists, chiropractors, dentists, and pharmacists. Some
statutes also require optometrists, general hospital personnel, and
even Christian Science practitioners to report. 54 At this writing, at
least forty-five states specifically require designated medical
professionals to report. 55 The remaining states require medical
professionals to report under reporting mandates which cover all
56
citizens.
Recognizing that other professionals having regular contact
with children are also in a position to identify abuse and neglect
before a child needs medical care for serious injuries, most states
now mandate specific nonmedical professionals to report. Among
those commonly required to report are teachers5 7 or other school

46. See McCoid, supra note 1, at 27-28; Paulsen, supra note 5, at 711.
47. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, §903 (Supp. 1976); HAW. REV. STAT. §350-1 (Supp.

1975).
48. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-104(2)(i)
(Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
49. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3620.A (Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 413 (McKinney 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.8 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
50. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §74-111(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§ 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976).
51. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (West Supp. 1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235A.2(4), .3(1)(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2204(c) (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
52. E.g., KAN. STAT. § 38-717 (Supp. 1976); Md. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(1), (c)
(1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 41-3 (McKinney 1976).
53. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.030(1) (Supp. 1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.8 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
54. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1975) (hospital personnel); ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.17.020(a) (1975) (practitioners of the healing arts); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.421 (Page 1976) (hospital resident or intern; religious healer); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 1353(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (hospital administrator, resident, intern).
55. See note 36 supra.
56. See IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2(a) (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.01 (Vernon 1975);
UTAH CODE ANN. §55-16-2 (Supp. 1977).
57. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (West Supp. 1977); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 350-1 (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(C)(1) (West 1974); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. §26-10-10 (1976); VA. CODE §63.1-248.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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61
officials, 58 social workers, 59 police officers, 60 child care workers,
65
64
63
clergymen, 62 coroners, and attorneys, as well as others.
The rapid widening of reporting mandates is dramatically
documented by a recent survey:

In 1973, 31 states required teachers or other school personnel to
make reports. Since that time, six additional states have added
education personnel. Also in 1973, only 10 states provided that
persons in day care centers or child caring institutions make
reports. Currently, some provision is made in 23 states for
mandatory reporting from these centers. Thirty-two states, in
1973, mandated social workers to make reports. Four more states
have since added this category. Fourteen states, in 1973,
child
required law enforcement personnel to report suspected
66
abuse or neglect. Currently, 26 states so require.
State laws often contain a limiting phrase requiring professionals to report only situations "known to them in their professional or
official capacity." 67 Thus, for example, if a physician suspects that a
neighbor's child, who is not his patient, is abused or neglected, he is
not required to make a report - in recognition of the inability to
enforce such a provision and the social and community pressures
involved. 68 Nothing, however, prevents the professional from
making a voluntary report like any other citizen; and, indeed, he is
encouraged to do so.
58. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 903 (Cum. Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750
(1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
59. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §51A (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney
1976); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.8 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
60. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §74-111(a) (Cum.Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235A.3(1)(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.115(1) (Supp. 1976).
61. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-808 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169:40 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-03(1) (Supp. 1977).
62. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (West Supp. 1976); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-23-9 (Cum.Supp. 1977).
63. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1977);

Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.115(1) (Supp. 1976).
64. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE

ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976).
65. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1975) ("mental health professionals"); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (West Supp. 1977) (administrator of public or private
summer day camp); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(c) (1976) (law enforcement officer);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West Supp. 1976) (guidance or family
counselors); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169:40 (Supp. 1975) (psychologist, therapist);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976) (psychologist, speech pathologist and

audiologist).
66. G. DAHL, supra note 12, at 5.
67. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 1976).
68. See Helfer, The Responsibility and Role of the Physicianin THE BATTERED
CHILD,

supra note 4, at 44.
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The continued expansion of reporting laws to include a wider
class of mandated reporters theoretically increases the probability
that more cases will be detected and reported. Thus, a growing
number of states, at least twenty as of this writing, require "any
69
person" to report known and suspected child abuse and neglect.
Overgeneralizing the class of persons who are legally required to
report may diminish the impact and enforceability of a reporting
law. "If the reporting group as delineated by statute is large, the
impact of the reporting requirement may be diffused, and everybody's duty may easily become nobody's duty." 0
C.

Voluntary Reporting

Despite all the attention paid to mandatory reporting laws, and
despite the constantly expanding coverage of these laws, the great
bulk of abuse and neglect reports continue to be made by individual
concerned citizens. Private citizens - friends, neighbors, and
relatives - though not subject to a mandatory reporting law in
thirty states, make about fifty percent of the nation's reports. 71 It is
only within this broader context of reporting by private citizens, as
well as mandated professionals that the detection of child abuse and
child neglect - and hence, the initiation of child protective services
- can be understood.
But because these reports are not "mandated," they are often not
"accepted" for investigation by child protective agencies. 72 And even
when they are, they often are given the lowest investigative
priority 73 - regardless of the danger to the child. Distinctions based
on who makes a report have no place in child protective efforts; the
danger to the child is no less serious merely because the report is
made by a private citizen or a nonmandated professional instead of
a legally mandated reporter. Reports from any source should be
handled in the same way, with the child protective service
establishing investigative priorities based only upon the real
urgency of the case - not on the basis of who made the report.
Routing all reports through the formal reporting channels
established by a reporting law helps ensure that they are duly
recorded and promptly investigated. Thus, to combat the tendency to
69. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 2i (Supp. 1975); ("any other person called upon to
render aid or medical assistance"); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1967); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (West Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.01 (Vernon
1975). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, §211m (Supp. 1977).
70. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 713.
71. NATIONAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
72. See, e.g., N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 31.
73. See, e.g., id. at 34.
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neglect nonmandated reports, at least twenty states have a specific
statutory provision requiring,7 4 and at least twenty states have a
provision permitting 75 "anyone" to report. The state eligibility
requirements under the Federal Act also recognize this problem and
thus require that, in addition to mandating certain persons to report,
a state must have "a law or administrative procedure which
requires, allows, or encourages all other citizens, to report known or
suspected instances of child abuse and neglect."76 Voluntary
reporting provisions often give the voluntary reporter immunity
from liability for a good faith report and abrogate any privileged
77
communication that might otherwise apply.
There are some special considerations involved with voluntary
reports. Nationwide, fifty to seventy percent of the reports from
mandated professionals are considered "valid" or "founded" somewhat amorphous and ambiguous terms - after investigation,
depending upon the specific profession involved. 78 Only forty percent
of the reports from voluntary reporters, on the other hand, are found
to be valid.7 9 Many of these invalid reports are made by spouses or
relatives seeking to gain custody of a child.80 Thus, while voluntary
reports must be accepted and investigated, continuous vigilance on
the part of child protective agencies is necessary to deal with
inappropriate or biased reports.
Recognizing the concern some professionals and private citizens
have about associating their names with child abuse and neglect
reports, most states allow anonymous reports by not prohibiting
them. Nationwide, thirty percent of these anonymous reports are
found to be valid.8 1 But states do not encourage anonymity because
of the obvious dangers in investigating reports for whom no one is
willing to take responsibility. Moreover, when professionals and
citizens identify themselves, the investigating agency can often
learn more about the case by interviewing the person who made the
report.

74. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 414 (McKinney 1976).
75. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.6 (West Supp. 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-109
(1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 722.624, .632 (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3) (West Supp. 1976);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976).
76. C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(d)(2)(i) (1976).
77. See text accompanying notes 106 & 121 infra.
78. American Humane Association, Children's Division. These data are on file at

the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, Washington, D.C.
79. Id.
80. See generally N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 62, 64.
81. American Humane Association, Children's Division. See note 78 supra.
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D. Reporter's State of Mind
Almost without exception, state reporting laws do not require
individuals making a report to be certain a child is abused or
neglected. Usually the law is couched in terms such as "has cause to
suspect," "reasonably suspects," "has cause to believe," or "believes." Except for the last example, these phrases are all meant to
describe degrees of conviction in the reporter's mind between an
unfounded suspicion and probable cause to believe. Because of the
impracticality of making minute distinctions in subtle child
maltreatment cases, there seems to be general agreement that these
terms are fundamentally equivalent and represent a lesser quantum
of evidence than probable cause.8 2 It has been noted that
[t]he effect of this language is that the reporter's diagnosis need
not be absolute. He does not have to prove conclusively, even to
himself, that the child is a victim of inflicted injury. If the
circumstances are such as to cause him to feel doubt about the
history given; if he has cause to doubt the truthfulness of the
person who tells him about the alleged accidental cause of the
injury; or if X-ray or other examinations reveal symptoms and
facts inconsistent with the circumstances described, then he has
sufficient "reasonable cause to suspect" that the injuries may
have been inflicted rather than accidental. 8 3This would be
enough to satisfy the requirements of the law.

The basis for a report can include the nature of the child's
injuries; the history of prior injuries to a child; the condition of a
child, his personal hygiene, and his clothing; the statements and
demeanor of a child or parent - especially if the injuries to the child
are at variance to the parental explanation of them; the condition of
the home; and the statements of others. After a report is made, the
child protective agency is responsible for determining the child's true
condition and, if action is necessary, for beginning the process of
protection and treatment.
E.

Circumstances Requiring A Report

Although state laws still vary greatly in specifying what
circumstances or conditions must or may be reported, an increasing
number of states are going beyond the special attention that was

82. See, e.g., Op. ILL. Arr'y GEN., S-1298 (Oct. 6, 1977); OP. MASS. ATT'Y GEN.
74/75-66 (June 16, 1975).
83. DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5, at 8.
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earlier given to the "Battered Child Syndrome. ' 84 Early reporting
laws, generally based on the United States Children's Bureau
guidelines,8 5 required reporting of "nonaccidental injuries," and
sometimes added the broader phrase "other serious abuse or
maltreatment. ' 86 However, placing attention on only one form of
abuse or neglect establishes false and dangerously misleading
distinctions. Child neglect can be just as damaging and just as
deadly as child abuse.
Even before the passage of the Federal Act in 1974,87 which
requires states to provide for the reporting of child neglect as well as
child abuse in order to receive special grants, 88 states had begun to
deal with other forms of inadequate parental care of children,
including: child battering, physical attack, delinquency, abandon-

ment, emotional maltreatment, failure to provide adequate food,
clothing, shelter, and failure to provide proper supervision and care.
Either expressly or within broader reporting mandates, at least
forty-two states require mandated professionals and allow all others
to report child neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional abuse. 89 Twenty-

five states expressly permit any person 9° and forty-five states, the
District of Columbia, and two territories expressly require designated professionals 9' to report some form of neglect. Twenty-two
states expressly permit 92 and thirty-nine expressly require, the

84. The term "battered child syndrome" was proposed by Dr. C. Henry Kempe in
1961 at a symposium conducted by the American Academy of Pediatrics. Radbill, A
History of Child Abuse and Infanticide, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 4, at 16.
For a detailed history of the development of the concept of the "battered child
syndrome," see McCoid, supra note 2, at 3-19.
85. See note 37 and accompanying text supra;THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note
4, at 181-83.
86. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 39A (West 1969) (amended 1973); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(a) (repealed 1973).
87. See note 9 supra.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975). For the text of pertinent parts of § 5103,
see text accompanying note 10 supra.
89. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 20(1) (Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07 (West
1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.03(D), .031(A) (Page 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2203 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
90. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18951(e)(2)-(5) (West Supp. 1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 11161.6 (West Supp. 1977); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-6, 10-10
(1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-3, 6A-2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
91. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(1)(b), (4) (West 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23,
§§ 2053, 2054 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.3(1) (West Cum. Supp.
1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.21(c), .10 (West 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-202(6),
(7), -1203 (1977); VA. CODE §§ 63.1-248.2(A)(2), .3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
92. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 412(1), (2),
414 (McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§2203, 2205 (Purdon Cum. Supp.
1977-1978).
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reporting of sexual abuse. 93 Moreover, thirty-five expressly permit,9 4
and at least thirty states expressly require95 reporting of emotional
abuse or neglect, often using the phrase "mental injury."
While the expansion of reporting requirements has resulted in

an increase in the number of abuse and neglect situations coming to
the attention of the authorities,9 6 many of the reports now handled
within the formal process were previously handled outside the
mandated reporting process - by the police, welfare agencies, and
the courts. Thus, much of the increase in cases being reported merely
reflects a shifting of investigative responsibilities from a haphazard
and uncoordinated amalgam of independent agencies to one single,
specialized child protective agency.
Although it seems fair to say that traditional definitions, as well
as those now emerging, are designed to help protect children from
harm, this laudable purpose has not prevented them from being
controversial. Such disagreement is a reasonable response to our
present state of knowledge. The definition an individual favors is
inextricably linked to his or her professional objectives, cultural
perspectives, and personal attitudes. Researchers, physicians, social
workers, child protective workers, police officers, lawyers, courts,
and social planners all have somewhat different objectives. In the
absence of a clear and widely accepted definition, these differing
objectives naturally color the definitions adopted by individuals and
professional groups.
The definition of child abuse and neglect in the Federal Act is a
good example of the difficulty inherent in applying one definition to
a variety of objectives. The Act defines "child abuse and neglect" as
"the physical or mental injury, sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or
maltreatment of a child under the age of eighteen by a person who is
responsible for the child's welfare under circumstances which
indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or threatened
thereby .... ,,97
93. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 20(1)(1), 21 (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN.

(Cum. Supp. 1975); R.I.

GEN. LAWS

§§ 14-28.7, .8 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
94. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.110(1)(1), .115(1)(4) (Supp. 1976); S.D.
LAWS ANN.

§ 42-808

§§40-11-2(2)(c), -3 (Supp. 1976); Wyo.

STAT.

COMPILED

§26-8-6, 10-10 (1976).

95. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 20(1)(1), 21 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§37-1202, 1203 (1977).

§§ 10-1301(2)(a), -1304 (Cum. Supp. 1977);

96. Writing in 1973, one researcher noted that "[i]n 1968, reports of child abuse
filed in all state registries amounted to approximately 11,000. By 1972, although no
precise data are available, the number of reports had more than doubled." Light,
Abused and Neglected Children in America: A Study of Alternative Policies in THE
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 203 (Harv. Educ. Rev. 1974). By 1978, the American Humane
Association estimated that over 400,000 reports were made nationwide. See note 78
supra.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 5103 (Supp. V 1975).
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This general and broad definition suits research and demonstration activities perfectly. Its breadth, however, has proven
disadvantageous to states seeking to comply with the Federal Act's
eligibility requirements in order to receive grants in aid. 98
The dilemma of choosing between general, and therefore
somewhat vague, definitions and specific, and therefore potentially
over-narrow, definitions will be with us for some time. Listing with
precise specificity all those actions that constitute child abuse and
neglect raises the possibility of inadvertantly excluding dangerous
situations that should be included. Generalized definitions risk
overbroad applications that include behavior that should not be
considered abusive or neglectful. Those who believe that most
children and families generally benefit from the child protective
process wish to expand the definition. Those less sanguine about the
utility of child protective intervention naturally want to restrict the
definition.
The statutory definition of reportable child abuse and neglect is
no doubt the most controversial issue in child protective theory, if
not practice. A detailed discussion of the concerns and considerations in developing specific definitions of child abuse and child
neglect - including issues of constitutionally impermissible vagueness - are beyond the scope of this paper. 99 For the purpose of this
paper, it is sufficient to note that the definition of circumstances
requiring a report, which also defines the child protective agency's
jurisdiction, is now recognized as a sufficiently important issue to
justify a separate definitional section in the reporting statutes of
forty states and two territories, whereas only eighteen states had
separate definitional sections in 1973.100
There is some question about whether reports should be
"accusatory." It is argued that compelling a potential reporter to
state whom he suspects is responsible for the abuse or neglect may
discourage reporting because: 1) it is often impossible or too early for
a potential reporter to make such a determination; 2) the potential
reporter may fear possible retribution for blaming a parent; and 3)
an accusatory report is inconsistent with the rehabilitative and
nonpunitive philosophy of the child protective process. 1 1 The major

98. Id. § 5103(b)(2). See note 9 supra.
99. For a discussion of the problems with definitions in these statutes, see
McCoid, supra note 2, at 44-50; Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of
the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1967).
100. See G. DAHL, supra note 12, at 3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(1) (West
1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, §845 (West Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §63.1-248.2 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
101. See DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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arguments in favor of accusatory reports seem to be that: 1) potential
reporters will not report injuries unless they have cause to suspect

that the parents are responsible; 2) it is unfair to parents who clearly
do not abuse and neglect their children to report them to the child
protective agency and enter their names in a central register merely
because their children have sustained injuries; and 3) it is unfair to
the child protective agency to be burdened with so many additional
reports of cases in which the reporter has no reason to suspect the
parents of any misbehavior. Balancing these various considerations,
02
twenty-eight states expressly require accusatory reports.
V.

IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY FOR REPORTING

Fear of being sued unjustly for libel, slander, defamation,
invasion of privacy, and breach of confidentiality is frequently cited
as a deterrent to more complete reporting. 10 3 This fear exists even
though applying existing legal doctrines leads to the conclusion that
anyone making a legally mandated or authorized report would be
free from liability so long as the report was made in good faith.
"[T]he point is that the common law and all of our decisional
authority already confers such immunity, and there is no American
case that even suggests that there may be liability for a good faith
' 10
report of the kind required by battered child statutes.'

4

Nevertheless, in the experience of many states, only an explicit
statutory grant of immunity from liability for reporting in good faith
erases the hesitancy of potential reporters. Hence, all states
specifically grant mandated reporters immunity from civil and
criminal liability for good faith reports. 105 In addition, at least forty
states now extend immunity from liability to voluntary reporters, as
long as the report was made in good faith, 0 6 partly in response to
107
the requirements of the Federal Act.
To reassure potential reporters further, some states have added a
provision to their immunity clause that presumes the good faith of
102. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-108(2)(b) (Cum.Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§827.07(5) (West 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §35A(d)(5) (1976). The issue is
somewhat ambiguous because its resolution is dependent upon local practice and the
format of the official reporting form. See note 237 and accompanying text infra.
103. See Paulsen, supra note 99, at 31-34.
104. Foster & Freed, supra note 8, at 1071, citing McCoid, The Battered Child and
Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 36-40 (1965). See also Paulsen,
supra note 99, at 31-34.
105. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.13 (West 1976) (does not specifically require good
faith); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 34.03 (Vernon 1975).
106. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620
(Cum.Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§110-118(c), -120 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1975); 45 C.F.R. 1340.3-3(d)(1) (1976).
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those acting under the reporting law. 0 8 However, such provisions
are technically redundant, at best, since a person suing must prove
the reporter's bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence in order
to recover in a civil action. Furthermore, under the so-called Thayer
Rule concerning the rebuttal of presumptions, 10 9 the presumption of
good faith could be rebutted by some credible evidence suggesting
that the report was made maliciously. Query: If the presumption is
successfully rebutted, does the plaintiff still have the burden of
proving bad faith by a preponderance of the evidence? Perhaps the
best thing to say is that the presumption of good faith is a public
relations provision, designed to soothe potential reporters, which
does not take into account how presumptions operate in the law.
At least forty statutes specifically extend the grant of immunity
to participation in judicial proceedings" 0 and at least eight to the
performance of other acts authorized by law, such as taking
photographs and x-rays,"' although this, too, seems legally superfluous.112

Because fear of lawsuits is frequently cited as a deterrent to
more complete reporting, the immunity provisions of state law
should be clearly explained in any public and professional education
13
campaign."

VI.

ABROGATION OF CERTAIN PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

Child abuse and child neglect usually occur behind closed doors
without witnesses. In determining whether a child has been abused
or neglected, great reliance is placed, necessarily, on medical
evidence and on the statements of the child and the admissions of
the parents. However, many of the professionals most likely to see
abused and neglected children are subject to statutory privileges
making confidential the communications between them and their

108. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §19-10-110 (CuM. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN.

§827.07(9) (West 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §10-904 (1968) (renumbered
§ 10-1306 (Cum. Supp. 1977)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1209 (1977).
109. See J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 336 (1898). For a
discussion of the development and present statement of the Thayer rule, see generally
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 345, at 821 (2d ed. E. Cleary

1972).
110. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, §906 (Cum. Supp. 1976); IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-4
(1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.135 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-4 (Supp. 1976).

111. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-814 (Cum. Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§19-10-110 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §419 (McKinney 1976); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 35.04(c) (Vernon Supp. 1976).
112. See Paulsen, supra note 99, at 34.
113. See also notes 314 & 315 and accompanying text infra.
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clients or patients.' 14 Depending on the state, statutes establish
privileges in relation to the communications between physician and
patient, social worker and client, psychologist and client, and priest
and penitent. 115 There is an exception in some states to the
6
confidentiality rule when a crime has been or will be committed.11
In all states most forms of child abuse and child neglect are
crimes.1 1 7 Ordinarily, persons subject to such privileges are prohibited from divulging anything told to them within the scope of the
privilege, unless the protected person gives permission. 8
If the privileged nature of such communications were to remain
intact, many cases of known and suspected child abuse and neglect
could not be reported. For example, physicians might feel unable to
report suspicious injuries without the permission of parents.
Investigative efforts would also be hampered if persons having
important information about a case were prohibited from revealing
it. For example, parents often tell spouses or helping professionals
what caused a child's injuries. Unless the spouse or professional can
give this information to the protective services worker and can
testify about it, a child demonstrably needing protection may not
receive it.
Even though a legal mandate to report presumably overrides
any other law creating a privileged communication 1 9 - especially if
the reporting law was enacted after the law creating the privilege in order to allay any residual concerns that potential reporters may
have about relating information gained as a result of their
confidential relationship with clients, many state reporting laws
contain specific clauses abrogating statutorily created privileges.
Some statutes abrogate the privileges attached to those professionals
required to report. 1 20 Other statutes abrogate all privileges, even if

114. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-601, -606, -607 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (attorneys,
ministers, priests, physicians, and nurses); IND. CODE § 34-1-14-5 (1973) (attorneys,
physicians, clergymen).
115. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 4504, 4505, 4507, 4508 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
116. For example, the attorney-client privilege does not extend to communications
in which the client informs the atttorney of the intent to commit a crime in the future.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR4-101(C)(3). See generally McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 95 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
117. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§940.201 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).
118. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (also listing of
other limited exceptions to doctor-patient privilege).
119. See MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT, § 11 (Aug. 1977 draft); note 129 infra.
120. E.g., IND. CODE §12-3-4.1-5 (1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. §626.556(8) (West
Supp. 1976); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 1975); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 55-16-5 (1974).
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the professionals involved are not required to report. 12 1 Many
reporting statutes also specifically abrogate these privileges for the
purpose of participating in judicial proceedings relating to abuse or
neglect. 122 Such provisions appear to be unnecessary unless either 1)
the person wishing to testify is not a person required or authorized to
report child abuse and neglect or 2) the person wishing to testify has
a privilege that does not contain an exemption when a crime has
123
been or will be committed.
Generally,"child protective reporting laws do not abrogate the
attorney-client privilege. But in abrogating all privileges, at least
five states appear to abrogate the attorney-client privilege because
they require everyone to report known and suspected child abuse and
neglect, 124 and "everyone" presumably includes attorneys. Abrogating the attorney-client privilege would destroy the confidence and
trust between an attorney and client necessary for a fair trial, and
could be held an unconstitutional denial of the right to counsel of
due process. 125 Moreover, abrogation of the attorney-client privilege
is probably unnecessary, since the child should have been protected
and sufficient evidence obtained long before an attorney is assigned
to a case. In those few cases in which the attorney learns of abuse or
neglect while representing the family in other matters, the attorneyclient privilege would not attach, since the privilege does not apply
to future criminal activity known to the attorney, and it is fair to
assume that child abuse and neglect, as a course of conduct, would
126
fall under such an exemption.
When a parent is already receiving help from a treatment
professional, the need to report abuse or neglect is sometimes
questioned because reporting to the child protective agency and
testifying in court may only reinforce the insecurity and hostility
many abusive and neglectful parents feel and may disturb the
treatment already in progress. Obviously, such concerns collide
121. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2060 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 210.140 (Supp. 1976) (except attorney-client privilege); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10
(Supp. 1977) (except attorney-client privilege).
122. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.631

(Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.2(A) (1976).
123. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
124. See MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10- 1304, -1307 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (abrogating
all privileges and requiring attorneys to report); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.506 (1973)
(abrogating all privileges and requiring attorneys to report); N.M. STAT. ANN.

§§ 13-14-14.1, -14.2(A) (1976) (abrogating all privileges and requiring all persons to
report); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§848, 846(A) (West Supp. 1977) (abrogating all
privileges and requiring all persons to report).
125. See DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5, at 12. Admittedly, in the context of the
comments made about abrogation of other professional privileges, this point must
seem self-serving when made by lawyers.
126. See note 116 and accompanying text supra.
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head-on with the abrogation of privileged communications. In order
to prevent mandated reporting from disrupting ongoing therapeutic
relationships, many treatment professionals do not report known or
suspected child abuse and neglect except in extreme situations. 127 In
fact, a large number of local child protective services, and some state
child protective offices encourage professionals to disregard the legal
requirement to report such cases.12 This procedure is both healthy
and dangerous, for, while it engrafts necessary flexibility onto
absolute legal stricture, it also weakens the imperative of the law
without making provision for monitoring its application. Furthermore, most professionals cannot provide the full range of services
that a child protective agency can provide. Even, when the
professional is of the highest quality, he or she cannot become
involved in the total family situation, cannot make regular home
visits, and may not view the protection of the child as his or her
primary responsibility.
A better approach would seem to be to formalize a procedure
through which the local child protective agency can review a
situation after a report is made to decide whether a full child
protective investigation is necessary. Under the Model Child
Protection Act (Model Act), 129 for example, the local child protective
agency, though still responsible for handling cases, is authorized to
waive a full child protective investigation of reports made by
agencies or individuals specified in the local plan if, after an
appropriate assessment of the situation, it is satisfied that (i) the
protective and service needs of the child and the family can be
met by the agency or individual, (ii) the agency or individual
agrees to attempt to do so, and (iii) suitable safeguards are
established and observed. Suitable safeguards shall include a
written agreement from the agency or individual to report
periodically on the status of the family, a written agreement to
report immediately to the local service at any time that the
child's safety or well-being is threatened despite the agency's or
127. See Heifer, supra note 68, at 44.
128. See also, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3853(1) (Supp. 1977). This statute
specifically states that it
does not require any person to report when the factual basis for knowing or
suspecting child abuse or neglect came from treatment of the individual for
suspected child abuse or neglect, the treatment was sought by the individual for
a problem relating to child abuse or neglect, and, in the opinion of the person
required to report, the child's life or health is not immediately threatened.
Id. See also N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 32.
129. MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT (Aug. 1977 draft). This act was drafted by the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, U.S. Department of Health, Education
and Welfare.
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individual's efforts, and periodic monitoring of the agency's or
individual's efforts by the local service for a reasonable period of
30
time.
In summary, although abrogations of privileges are absolute,
protective workers, judges, and prosecutors should apply them with
discretion, especially in situations involving communications
between spouses and with treatment professionals with whom the
parents have developed a trusting relationship.
VII. PENALTIES FOR FAILURE TO REPORT
If provisions for immunity from liability, the abrogation of
privileged communications, and public education are the carrots to
encourage fuller reporting, penalties for failure to report are the stick
to enforce it. Although the ultimate success of a child protective
reporting system must depend upon the willing cooperation of
professionals and the public, reporting requirements need enforceable provisions for those who refuse to accept their moral obligation
to protect endangered children. Thus, at this writing, the reporting
laws of at least thirty-nine states contain specific penalty clauses for
failure to report. Of that number, thirty provide a criminal penalty
only, 13' one provides for a civil penalty only, 32 and four states and
one territory provide both criminal and civil penalties. 33 The
criminal penalty is normally of misdemeanor level with the potential
fine and/or imprisonment ranging from $100 and/or five days up to
$1000 and/or one year. 34 Some states provide penalties for failure to
take other mandated protective actions, such as the taking of
135
photographs and x-rays of areas of visible trauma.
However, "[w]hile failure to report is criminal in most states,
there has never been, nor is there likely to be, a prosecution.' ' 36 But
perhaps there should be a criminal prosecution when the failure to
report reflects a willful disregard of danger to a child. In fact, in a
few instances known to this writer, police agencies seeking to

130. Id. § 16(d).
131. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 25 (Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (West
1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. §827.07(11) (West 1976).
132. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, §3853(1) (Supp. 1977).
133. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-816 (Cum. Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-10-104(4) (Cum.Supp. 1976); N.Y. SoC. SERV. LAw §420 (McKinney 1976).
134. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-816(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (up to 5 days
imprisonment and $100 fine); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (West 1970) (up to six-months
imprisonment and/or fine up to $500); Mo. REV. STAT. §210.165 (Supp. 1976) (up to
$1000 fine and/or one-year imprisonment).
135. See note 153 and accompanying text infra.
136. See Dembitz, supra note 22, at 626 n.8.
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enforce reporting requirements have brought mandated professionals before magistrates, although only verbal warnings have resulted
so far.
A more likely, and, as a consequence, probably a more effective,
encouragement to fuller reporting is the prospect of a civil lawsuit
for damages arising from failure to report. Although five states and
one territory have explicitly legislated civil liability,1 37 such liability
probably already exists in all states with a mandatory reporting law.
Under common law tort doctrines, the violation of a statutory duty
- in this instance the required reporting of known and suspected
abuse and neglect - is "negligence per se.' 1 38 In 1967 Dean Monrad
Paulsen predicted:
[I]t seems likely that reporting statutes which require reporting
and which carry criminal penalties create a cause of action in
favor of infants who suffer abuse after a physician has failed to
make a report respecting earlier abuse brought to his attention.
Further, the failure to comply with a mandatory statute which is
not supported by criminal penalties may well give rise to civil
liability by analogy to the cases upholding recovery based on
139
negligence established by a breach of the criminal law.
The correctness of Dean Paulsen's analysis has since been
established in two recent California cases. In 1972, a lawsuit was
brought against the police, a hospital, and individual doctors in
California for failure to report a child's suspicious injuries which
had come to their attention. 40 Because they did not report, the
unprotected child was further beaten by his parents and suffered
permanent brain damage. 14' The case was settled out of court for
over half a million dollars. The case, and especially the settlement,
received wide notice within the medical community. 42 The other
case, Landeros v. Flood,1 43 was not settled out of court, and the
California Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action against a doctor who failed to
diagnose and report a case of the Battered Child Syndrome.1 4 The

137. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-816(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-10-104(4)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 420(2) (McKinney 1976).

138. Failure to comply with a statutory mandate "in itself' establishes the
negligence of the act of omission. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
139. Paulsen, supra note 99, at 36.
140. TIME, November 20, 1972, at 74.
141. Id.
142. Id.

143. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
144. Id. at 408, 551 P.2d at 393, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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child had been brought to the hospital with a broken leg, caused by a
145
twisting force for which there was no natural explanation.
Furthermore, the child had bruises and abrasions over her entire
body, and appeared fearful when approached by adults. As a result
of the physician's alleged negligence, the child was returned to her
parents and severely beaten again, suffering permanent physical
injury. 146 The California Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had
stated a cause of action on theories of both common law and
147
statutory negligence.
There are also positive treatment reasons for civil and criminal
penalties. Penalty clauses tend to assist mandated reporters in
working with parents by making it easier to explain to parents why
a report must be made. In addition, experience shows that a penalty
clause is invaluable to staff members of agencies and institutions
who often must persuade their superiors of the necessity of making a
report. For example, nurses frequently relate how the mention of the
potential liability for failure to report is the only argument that
convinces reluctant hospital administrators to commence protective
148
action.
A common basis of liability in state statutes is "knowing and
willful failure" to report. Since negligence per se is established by
merely proving failure to comply with a statutory mandate, 149 this
specific standard of liability may limit the situations in which
liability can arise and may narrow the broader common law
liability. Most states having adopted this stricter standard of
liability seem to do so on the grounds that it is unfair to penalize
honest mistakes in interpreting the difficult and ambiguous facts
surrounding most child abuse and neglect situations. They conclude
that a person must know about his obligations under the reporting
law and must intentionally fail to fulfill them before being held
criminally or civilly liable. Thus, in those states using the "knowing
and willful" test, the mandated reporter must have a conscious
suspicion that a child is abused or neglected, and know that he must
report and still not do so. Among the situations that could lead to the
conclusion that a person "knowingly or willfully" failed to report
would be: 1) when a child complains to such a person that he is being
abused or neglected, 2) when the parents tell such person about their
abusive or neglectful conduct, and 3) when a reputable individual

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 405, 551 P.2d at 391, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
Id. at 405-06, 551 P.2d at 391, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
Id. at 413, 551 P.2d at 396, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
See generally N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 29.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 138, at § 36.
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warns such a person that a child is being or was abused and
neglected and instead of disputing the accuracy of the warning, the
person says, in effect: "So what, it is none of my business."
Although penalty provisions are a valuable and necessary
component of an effective reporting law, it must be emphasized that
ignorance and misunderstanding of the reporting law and of child
protective procedures are the main reason for underreporting. The
most effective way to encourage full and accurate reporting is
through professional and public education about the nature of child
abuse and neglect. Private citizens and especially professionals,
including child care professionals, physicians, nurses, social
workers, and teachers, must be made sensitive to the occurrence of
child abuse and neglect, must be able to identify it, and must know
how to report it. To make a penalty clause work, there must be a
continuing public and professional education and training pro5o
gram.1
VIII.

PHOTOGRAPH AND X-RAY AUTHORIZATIONS

Photographs and x-rays can be crucial to the identification and
management of child abuse and neglect cases. 151 For example, x-rays
often reveal telltale past injuries. Photographs and x-rays also
preserve evidence to support subsequent child protective decisionmaking and possible court action, particularly when case records
lack sufficient detail. 15 2 Long after memories have faded, photographs and x-rays can provide graphic and incontestable documentation of the severity of the child's initial condition. A photograph or
x-ray can be worth, as the clich6 goes, a thousand words.
Ordinarily, however, there would be some question about the
authority of hospital, child protective, and law enforcement officials
to take photographs or x-rays without parental permission. Hence, at
this writing, at least ten states have enacted statutes authorizing
mandated reporters to take, or to arrange to have taken, photographs and x-rays without parental permission.1 53 Sometimes, the
head of a medical facility is mandated to take x-rays or photographs
54
of areas of visible trauma.
150. See notes 314-16 and accompanying text infra.
151. Fontana, The Maltreated Children of Our Times, 23 VILL. L. REV. 452-53
(1978).
152. Under rules of evidence, such photographs and x-rays normally can be used in
any later court proceedings. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 1002. See notes 153-55 and
accompanying text infra.
153. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-10-106 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 416 (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page 1976); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2207 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
154. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 416 (McKinney 1976).
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To encourage the use of such provisions, at this writing, at least
six states provide for the reimbursement, at public expense, of the
55
costs of photographs and x-rays.'
IX.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AUTHORIZATIONS

In most child abuse and neglect situations, the child need not be
removed from his parents' care in order to protect his well-being and
future development. Indeed, in many situations, removal may be
harmful to the child. Children identify with their parents at a very
early age, seeing them as models for and as part of themselves.
Separation from parents can be experienced as a profound rejection,
or the child can introject into his own self-image the parental
inadequacy that led to the removal. 156 As a result, the child may see
separation from his parents as a deprivation or as a punishment for
his own inadequacy. The psychological wounds that can be caused
by removing a child from his parents have been repeatedly
described. 157 The conditions of foster care are frequently not
conducive to a child's emotional well-being. 158 Furthermore, removal
may hinder treatment efforts with the parents; it may destroy a
fragile family fabric and make it more difficult for the parents to
cope with the child when he is returned to their care.
But sometimes a child has to be removed from his parents' home
for his own safety or as part of an appropriate treatment plan for the
parents. When this happens, removing a child with the parents'
consent is preferred, because resort to unnecessary legal coercion can
be detrimental to later treatment efforts. In recognition of the
importance of parental consent, a number of states require that the
59
parents' agreement be sought before protective custody is invoked.
Frequently, however, a child must be removed from his home
without parental consent, and indeed against parental wishes, to
protect him from further harm. In such situations, the preferred
method of removing a child is through a court order. As in all
situations in which individual discretion is preeminent, there is
always the danger of careless or automatic, though well-meaning,

155. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-810 (Cum. Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.11
(West Cum. Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 416 (McKinney 1976); W. VA. CODE

§ 49-6A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
156. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 19, 20, 33, 40-42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
ANN.

OF THE CHILD].
157. See generally N. WEINSTEIN, THE SELF IMAGE OF THE FOSTER CHILD (1962).
158. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, supra note 156, at 23-26.
159. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(e) (West Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 9:6-8.27

(West 1976); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1021 (McKinney 1975).
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exercise of the power to place a child in protective custody. Prior
court review lessens such dangers by ensuring that a judge, an
outsider, reviews the administrative decision to place a child in
custody. Indeed, police and child protective agencies having
authority to remove a child against the parents' wishes are often
hesitant to do so without court authorization and often seek court
approval before placing a child in protective custody. 16°
Nevertheless, sometimes removal must occur before court review
is possible because, in the time it would take to obtain a court order,
the child might be further harmed or the parents might flee with the
child. In all states, the police are authorized to take a child into
protective custody, either under specific child protective legislation
or through their general law enforcement powers. 161 Moreover, under
the common law, anyone has the legal authority to use force in the
protection of a third person, although this is usually contingent upon
the existence of some sort of emergency or imminent danger. 162 In
recognition of the prime decisionmaking responsibility of child
protective workers, and presumably in the belief that authority
should accompany responsibility, a growing number of states, at
least thirteen at this writing, also grant protective custody power to
child protective agencies. 163 However, despite the fact that child
protective workers make most of the important decisions about the
initial handling of child abuse and neglect cases, some observers feel
that giving them direct authority to remove children will unduly
hamper their efforts to develop trusting treatment relationships with
families. 64 In any event, as a practical matter, forcible removal of a
child ordinarily is not attempted without police or law enforcement
assistance, because of the possible danger to the protective worker.
In the past, most provisions authorizing protective custody were
stated broadly, in general phrases such as "necessary to protect the
child's life or health.' 6 5 But past practice, in too many situations,

160. When the court is not in session, e.g., at night or on weekends, authorization
can usually be obtained by telephoning a judge at home. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§19-10-107 (Supp. 1976).
161. Specific legislative authorization is found in at least 45 states. E.g., DEL.
CODE tit. 10, § 933 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.165 (West 1971); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-13(1) (Supp. 1973).
162. See W. PROSSER, supra note 138, at § 20.
163. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-107 (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 51B(3) (West Supp. 1977); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 17.01 (Vernon Supp.
1976).
164. See A. SUSSMAN & S. COHEN, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT:
GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION 30 (1975).
165. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.15(3)(b) (West 1969) ("surroundings or
conditions which endanger the health or welfare of the child"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 43-205.01(3) (1974) ("when such child is seriously endangered in his surroundings").
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was to remove a child from his home first - and to ask questions
later. To prevent the indiscriminate use of protective custody, a

growing number of states have placed two limitations on when a
child may be taken into protective custody without a court order: 1) a

child must be in imminent danger, and 2) there must be no time to
apply for a court order.1 66 Examples of situations which require
immediate action because of imminent danger to the child include:

when children are being or are about to be attacked by their parents;
when they need immediate food, clothing, shelter, or medical care;

when children are left alone or unattended; or when it appears that
the entire family may disappear before the facts can be sorted out.
In an interesting legal nuance, a number of states make a
distinction between the test for reporting - "reasonable suspicions"

- and the test for taking a child into protective custody "reasonable cause to believe" that the child is in imminent
danger. 167 Although seemingly minor, this difference is one of
important degree because it signals the difference between the
subjective condition of the reporter's state of mind and the existence

of sufficient objective factors to cause a reasonable person to believe
that the child must be placed in protective custody.
More recently, a number of states have granted hospitals and
similar institutions a protective custody power called "twenty-four

hour hold."'I6 8 This authority is much broader than standard
protective custody authorization because there is usually no need to
establish that the child is in "imminent danger."' 169 Indeed, the
person in charge of such a facility is usually authorized to place a

child in protective custody "where he believes the facts so
warrant."' 170 Such broad language is designed to give hospitals and
similar institutions a flexible tool with which to deal with home
situations that appear explosive or dangerous.' 7' These situations
often arise in the middle of the night when outside guidance and
166. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.125(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976) (imminent danger and no possibility of immediate
court order); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.9 (Supp. 1977) (same).
167. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 21, 22(1) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1024(a)
(McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-13(1)(c) (1973), § 50-25.1-03 (Supp. 1977).
168. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.626 (Supp. 1977) (next court day) and
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.125(1) (Vernon Supp. 1976) (20 hours) and N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§417(2) (McKinney 1976) (next court day) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §2208(a)(2)
(Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) (24 hours) with ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(1) (Supp. 1975)
(72 hours) and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(d) (West Supp. 1976) (96 hours) and
VA. CODE § 63.1-248.9 (Supp. 1977) (72 hours).
169. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
170. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §417(2) (McKinney 1976).
171. Frequently, for example, hospital staff are concerned about the safety of a
child with suspicious injuries, or are unsure of the child's real name or address, or fear
that the parent will flee before a protective worker can make a home visit.
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assistance are unavailable. 172 But because of its radical nature, the
"twenty-four hour hold" is an emergency measure to enable other
components of a community's child protection system to have
enough time to mobilize.
Whatever the initial basis for placing a child in protective
custody, there is a real need for a court to review the initial
administrative decision. It may have been wrong; it may have been
based on incomplete or misunderstood facts, or the situation may
have changed since the decision was first made - for example,
counseling, homemaker, daycare, or housing services may have
succeeded in making the child's home safe for his return. Therefore,
the correctness of such decisions should be reviewed by a court as
soon as possible. Although many states put no time limit on
protective custody before court review, 173 a number of states do
provide a time limit. 174 Twenty-four hours seems to be a reasonable
length of time to authorize holding a child without court order.
Within that time, there is no reason why a judge cannot be reached.
The possibility of disturbing a judge at home is a small price to pay
for ensuring that the initial decision is promptly reviewed. 175 The
fact that such judicial reviews are frequently perfunctory does not
denude them of their value.
In many communities, the dearth of suitable facilities for the
temporary care of abused and neglected children has led to their
placement in a jail or a facility for the detention of criminal or
juvenile offenders. Such practices are wholly inappropriate to the
purposes and philosophy of child protective services, and a number
of state laws expressly forbid them. 76 Of course, such prohibitions
should not apply to situations where an abused or neglected child
requires secure detention because of his own misconduct and there is
independent legal authority for detaining him.
172. See note 160 supra.
173. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2055 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §260.165 (West 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §55-10-90 (1974).
174. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §22(1) (Supp. 1975) (72 hours), ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 8-546.01(D) (Supp. 1977) (48 hours); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(e) (West Supp.
1976) (96 hours); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815(c) (Supp. 1977) (next court
day); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1021 (McKinney 1975) (3 days).
175. Even in the most rural communities a judge or magistrate is available to hear
preliminary criminal matters: Colorado law, for example, facilitates around-the-clock
utilization of the "twenty-four hour hold" by allowing authorization by "a person
appointed by the juvenile judge, who may be the juvenile judge, a referee, or any other
officer of the court." COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-107 (Supp. 1976).
176. Compare IND. CODE § 31-5-7-23 (1976) (juveniles must be kept separate from
adult criminals) and S.C. CODE ch. 21, 14-21-590(c) (1977) (same) with IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.21 (West 1969) (children requiring detention shall be separated so far as
practicable from children requiring shelter) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.170(4) (1971)
(separation whenever possible).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss3/4

30

Bersharov: The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child Abuse an

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 445

Protective custody is only the beginning of the child protective
process. In utilizing protective custody, officials should bear in mind
that subsequent treatment efforts may be impaired if the parents are
not accorded full due process, not treated fairly or are not fully
informed about what is going on. All of these, of course, are
important goals in themselves. Some appropriate person, preferably
from the child protective agency, should tell the parents where the
child was taken, in order to calm their fears and to enable them to
maintain contact with their child. In unusual or severe cases, it may
not be prudent to inform the parents of the child's exact whereabouts
if it appears that the parents may seek to regain custody of the child
forcibly or otherwise interfere with his care. In such cases, contact
between the child and parent may have to be limited to highly
structured situations. Since the welfare of the child is an added
consideration, it is unlikely that failure to notify parents in such
cases would be considered grounds to terminate a protective custody
placement.
Protective custody must not be considered a final disposition of
the case. If not a child protective worker, the person taking a child
into protective custody should immediately notify the appropriate
local child protective service so that necessary protective, assessment, and treatment efforts can begin. During all stages of the case
- whether or not court action is commenced - the need for
protective custody should be continually reviewed, and an attempt
should be made to return the child to his home, "whenever it seems
reasonable and safe to do so."' 177 Even after a court proceeding has
begun, the child protective agency may still recommend to the court
that the child be returned to the parents pending further court
17
action.
It would be misleading to end a discussion of protective custody
without acknowledging that the undue delays caused by breakdowns
in the planning process, overburdened child protective staffs,
backlogged courts, inadequate long term alternatives, weak management procedures, and the absence of a host of other needed services
can turn temporary protective custody into long term care. Children
can be temporarily "parked" for months and even years in foster
homes, shelters, and hospitals where, if they are medically ready for
discharge, they are called "boarder babies. ' 179 Sadly, long term
planning for children - whether it means preparing the family for

177. MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT § 9(e) (Aug. 1977 draft).
178. E.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1026(a) (McKinney 1975).
179. N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 4.
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the child's return, establishing a long term foster care arrangement,
or permanently terminating parental rights - is too frequently
neither approached realistically nor completed expeditiously.
X.

REPORTING PROCEDURES

Reporting laws usually specify that reports are to be made
orally, s° often also requiring subsequent written confirmation.' 88
The first generation of reporting laws left the mode of implementing
these requirements to administrative decision. 182 Generally, reports
were to be made directly to a local child protective or law
enforcement agency. But ignorance of the local agency's telephone
number and the frequent absence of a specialized phone line at the
agency remained major stumbling blocks to more complete reporting. Consequently, in the early 1970's, a number of communities
and states established centralized reporting hotlines, at least ten
through legislation. 183 Such hotlines were meant to encourage
reporting by simplifying the reporting process, by having an easily
publicizable telephone number, and by ensuring that qualified
personnel would answer the phone at all hours of the day or night.
For statewide hotlines, a toll-free number was used to remove the
obstacle caused by the cost of a long distance call. A number of
states have begun to use facsimile telecopiers and remote access
computer terminals to receive and transmit reports.
When considering the establishment of reporting hotlines, states
and localities must consider whether to make them local or statewide
in scope. Each type has its own advantages and disadvantages, and
the final choice is the result of weighing complex programmatic and
political considerations. For example, the great 'economies of scale
and management enjoyed by statewide registers must be balanced
against the added burden of transmitting reports, made initially to
the state, to the local agency. On the other hand, when reports are
made locally, they are usually transmitted to the state for
recordkeeping purposes. Another factor to consider is the hesitancy
of some potential reporters to call a distant statewide number
because they want to discuss the situation with someone they know

180. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §827.07(5) (West 1975); NEB. REV. STAT. §28-1502
(1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-3 (Supp. 1977).
181. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (West Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
GEN. LAws § 40-11-6(2) (Supp. 1976).
182. See generally statutes cited note 216 infra.
183. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-818(A)(2) (Supp. 1975); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 235A.14(3) (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 422(2) (McKinney 1976); VA.
CODE § 63.1-248.6(C) (Supp. 1977).

§ 14:403(D)(4) (West 1974); R.I.
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or who is known in the community18 4 Therefore, some state laws
allow these decisions about where reports are received to be made on
18 5
a county-by-county basis.
Hotlines can perform important, ancillary functions by providing information and assistance to individuals who call. Qualified,
professional staff can refer inappropriate reports and self-reports
from parents seeking help, can advise potential reporters about the
law and child protective procedures, can assist in diagnosis and
evaluation, and can consult about the necessity of photographs, xrays, and protective custody. Thus, whether a state or local system is
used,1 86 staff answering the telephone should have social-work or
comparable qualifications, enabling them to offer effective and
sensitive assistance to parents and others calling for help.
Another question concerning reporting procedures is whether
written reports should be required in addition to oral reports. Many
authorities1 8 7 and some state laws188 dispense with written reports
on the ground that they discourage reporting. Requiring a written
report should make a reporter more careful about making a report.
And a written report, made some time after the initial telephone
report, may provide an early way to update the situation. Moreover,
written reports seem to provide added assurance that the initial oral
report will be investigated, because they are a physical record that a
report was actually made.
There is another factor in favor of written reports. A written
report can facilitate the proof of facts concerning early observations
of the child when agency records are nonexistent, hard to locate, or
vague. Under ordinary rules of evidence, the relevant records of
schools, hospitals, social service agencies, and other agencies which
establish direct evidence of suspected child abuse and neglect are
admissible under the "business records" exception to the rule
against hearsay. 8 9 Unfortunately, the recordkeeping practices of
many public and private agencies and institutions leave much to be
desired; often, the agency has no clear record of what happened or
what was observed. Since the reporter would ordinarily keep a copy
184. See generally N.Y. STATE DEP'r. of Soc. SERV., REPORT ON THE PROVISION OF
(1977).
185. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-546.01(c)(1) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.12 (West
1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.6(C) (Supp. 1977).
186. The Model Act envisions a statewide hotline with a toll-free number with

CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES

immediate transmission to a local agency unless the local plan for child protective
services requires "that oral reports ...
be made directly to the local child protective
service." MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT § 13(a) (Aug. 1977 draft).
187. See, e.g., DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5, at 180.
188. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 16-1616(e) (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2 (1976);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:6-8.10 (West 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §37-1203 (Supp. 1977).
189. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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of a written report, there would then exist a specific, detailed record
of his observations available for later reference and possible use in
court. At least five states have statutory provisions expressly
authorizing the admissibility of written reports. 19° However, even
without such legislation, if the normal requirements of the business
records rule1 91 are met, a report of suspected child abuse and neglect
would still be admissible. The usual rules of evidence, of course,
would have to be complied with, for example, the requirements of
testimony establishing a foundation for the admission of the
report' 92 and the exclusion of any double hearsay.193 And, of course,
the court would be free to attach whatever persuasive weight to the
report that it deemed appropriate.
XI.

AGENCIES THAT RECEIVE REPORTS

Without child abuse and neglect reporting laws, reports of child
maltreatment would continue to be made, as they were before the
passage of such laws, to law enforcement, child welfare or social
service agencies, and juvenile courts. When a law requires reports to
be made, it also must designate an agency to receive them. The issue
of which agency should be designated to receive reports has been
described as "one of the most critical elements of the reporting law.
The nature and orientation of the agency first receiving the report
194
will often determine the community's reponse to child abuse."'
Designating the police as recipients of reports, while helping to
ensure thorough investigations, has the disadvantage of stressing
the punitive tenor of the process and tends to discourage reporting
by physicians and other professionals. Designating social service
agencies emphasizes the rehabilitative and treatment aspects of the
process, but is sometimes seen as a "soft" response to brutal
crimes. 195 The first model legislation proposed by the United States
Children's Bureau 96 recommended that mandated reports be made
to law enforcement agencies, not because criminal prosecution is
needed, but because police agencies are available twenty-four hours
190. E.g., COLO. REV.STAT. § 19-10-108(4) (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 415
(McKinney 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2222(1) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).

191. See note 189 and accompanying text supra.
192. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) and Report of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
following the rule.
193. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 313 (2d ed. E.

Cleary 1972).
194. DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5 at 11.
195. See Paulsen, supra note 5 at 714.
196. U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, THE ABUSED CHILD
LANGUAGE

- PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED
FOR LEGISLATION ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD

(1963).
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a day, an essential capability in emergency child abuse cases. 197 The
present recognition that only social service agencies have the
treatment resources needed to handle maltreatment cases has led
most experts to advocate improving the investigative capability of
child protective agencies rather than creating a two-stage process of

police investigation and social service treatment. Thus, even though
child abuse and neglect are crimes in all states, 198 at least thirty-five

states now require reports to be made to social service agencies,
usually specially designated child protective agencies.1 99 Only a few
states still require that reports be made solely to law enforcement
2
agencies. 00

Often, however, no single agency is designated as the sole
agency to receive reports. Sixteen state statutes allow mandated

reporters to choose between the police or a child protective agency, 201
seven states allow mandated reporters to choose between three or
more specified agencies, 20 2 and six provide for a joint police and
child protective investigation. 20 3 Four states attempt to cover all
contingencies by requiring reports to be made to two or more
204
agencies.
The legislative ambivalence concerning the designation of the
agency to receive reports mirrors and magnifies the fragmentation

of basic child protective responsibility in most communities. This
diversity of overlapping reporting avenues increases the likelihood
of lost reports and administrative breakdowns. As cases are
misdirected, misplaced, or seriously delayed between agencies, the

lives of children who need immediate and sustained protection are
endangered.
Even the clearest and most precise law cannot guarantee how

reports will be made. The agency to which individuals actually

197. Id. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 714.
198. E.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 18-401, -1501 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-3 (West
1976); WYo. STAT. §§ 14-21 to -26 (1965).
199. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(1)(d), (4) (West 1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1
(1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-28.9 (Supp.
1975).
200. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§28-1502, -1503(1) (1975). See D.C. CODE §2-163
(1973).
201. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §74-111(b) (1973); OHo REV. CODE ANN. §2151.421
(Page 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030(1) (Supp. 1976).
202. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(D)(1)
(West 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (1977).
203. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(4)(a) (Supp. 1975) (agency "may"
investigate independently or in conjunction with other investigatory agency); IDAHO
CODE § 16-1625(a) (Supp. 1976) ("may" enlist help of police); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 28-1504(2) (1975) (same).
204. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 10-1304 (Cum. Supp. 11 1977).
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report depends on such diverse factors as their view of the need for
criminal prosecution, their view of the community's child protective
network, their view of the role and functions of the police and other
agencies, and such chance factors as their knowledge of the
reporting system and the time of day the report is made. Out of
ignorance, self-interest, or inertia, many persons, even when subject
to a mandatory reporting law, report to the agency they trust or
20

know best.

A recent statutory development of some note is the specific
requirement in at least twelve states that child abuse and neglect
fatalities be reported to medical examiners or coroners and district
attorneys. 206 Theoretically, at least, these provisions should not be
necessary, since all suspicious fatalities of adults as well as children
are required to be investigated by such officials. 20 7 However, child
fatalities are often not reported to them because of confusion,
administrative breakdown, or the assumption that someone else has
already reported the case to them. In some respects, this is an
example of how the wise decision not to require criminal court action
in most child abuse cases has been carried beyond reasonableness even cases of criminal homicide are not being brought to the
attention of law enforcement agencies. One might say that the
advocates of the decriminalization of child abuse cases have been
too successful. Some cases, especially brutal homicides, must be
referred for potential criminal prosecution.
XII.

LOCAL CHILD PROTECTIVE AGENCIES

After early emphasis on the "rescue" of children and the
prosecution of "offending" parents, there has been an accelerating
movement toward the provision of noncriminal and nonjudicial
social and rehabilitative services. In the decades after 1875, one can
see a slow but steadily increasing acceptance of the proposition that
criminal intent is usually not present in child abuse and neglect
cases and that treatment and ameliorative services, rather than
punishment and retribution, are the best means of protecting
endangered children. 20 8 The handling of child maltreatment now has
been almost completely decriminalized.
205. In nearly all communities, most reports, whether or not made pursuant to a

reporting law, are ultimately referred to child protective agencies. Even if the police
are designated to receive reports, they usually forward them to a child protective
agency or to the juvenile court for investigation and the provision of services, when
needed. See notes 210-11 and accompanying text infra.
206. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-809 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 51A (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 418 (McKinney 1976).
207. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1238 (Purdon 1972).
208. See generally THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 4.
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In nearly all communities, most reports are referred ultimately
to a child protective agency, regardless of which agency the
reporting law specifies to receive reports. Even if the police receive
reports, they ordinarily refer them to a child protective agency or to
a juvenile court. In some places and for certain types of cases, the
police may perform a parallel or joint investigation with the child
protective agency. 20 9 The reasons for this reliance on child protective
agencies include: 1) the necessity and benefits of providing
treatment services which are most readily available through a social
service agency like a child protective agency; 210 2) the inadequacy of
criminal court remedies and the unlikelihood of successful prosecution; 3) the advantage of using social casework skills in the
investigation itself; 4) the fact that the family benefits if therapeutic
treatment begins during the investigation; and 5) the very existence
of child protective agencies, upon which the police can "dump"
messy family matters that they do not like to handle. 211 But
whatever the motive, when child protective agencies investigate
reports and begin the process of helping parents, the underlying
causes of the abuse or neglect are most likely to be addressed and a
family's ability to nurture and protect its children is most likely to be
212
strengthened.
The local child protective agency is the heart of any community's child protective system. The local agency focuses state and
community efforts to prevent and treat child abuse and neglect.
Designating one, single agency in each community to receive and
investigate all reports eliminates the confusion and lack of
accountability that result when reports are handled by a number of
different agencies. 213 It is important to emphasize that a new agency
need not be established if an existing agency, or part of one, can
provide child protective services.
The purpose of child protective intervention is to protect the
health and enhance the welfare of children and families by
beginning the process of helping parents meet their child care
responsibilities. Except for certain extremely specialized services,
209. See notes 203 & 204 and accompanying text supra.
210. Examples of such assistance include traditional family counselling and
mental health services, and such newer, specialized resources for families in trouble
as: Parents Anonymous; hotlines, help lines, and other telephone counselling services;
child development centers, parent effectiveness training, and infant stimulation
centers; and crisis nurseries and drop-in services.
211. See generally D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY 134-38 (1974).
212. See Kempe, Some Problems Encountered by Welfare Departments in the
Management of the Battered Child Syndrome, in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra note 4,
at 169-71.
213. Cf. Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children in THE BATTERED CHILD, supra
note 4, at 191.
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treatment is best provided by community human service agencies
with a broader and more long-range responsibility for children and
families than the child protective service. It would be imprudent to
shift this fundamental social welfare responsibility away from
community resources and agencies which are already successfully
helping children and families, or to discourage the development of
additional community-based treatment and prevention programs. To
do so would be a costly duplication of existing services not likely to
receive the support of budgetary authorities. Such an attempt would
probably be doomed to failure anyway, because of the difficulities in
attracting the broad range of quality professionals needed for such a
narrowly focused service.
Specifically, the child protective agency is assigned the crucial
first steps of:
1) providing immediate protection to children, through
temporary stabilization of the home environment or, where
necessary, protective custody;
2) verifying the validity of the report and determining the
danger to the children;
3) assessing the service needs of children and families;
4) providing or arranging for protective, ameliorative, and
treatment services; and
5) instituting civil court action when necessary, to remove a
child from a dangerous environment or to impose treatment on
his family.
The local child protective agency offers the family whatever
available services can help the parents or the family. Many of these
services, such as financial assistance, day care, or homemaker care,
are concrete efforts to relieve the pressures and frustrations of
parenthood. Individual and family counseling services are also used
to ease the tensions of personal problems and marital strife.
Referrals are made to family service agencies, mental health clinics,
hospitals, and other social and child welfare services. Recently, a
number of Parents Anonymous groups have been established
throughout the country, and a referral is often made to one of these
groups. If the parent is an alcoholic or drug addict, he may be
referred for detoxification to a hospital, a methadone maintenance
program, a drug free program, an Alcoholics Anonymous program,
or a similar rehabilitation program. Only when such services are
refused or are inadequate is court action sought - usually in
214
juvenile or family court.
214. E.g.,

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. il,

§ 2217(9) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978).
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Until recently, however, insufficient attention has been paid to
the need to establish strong and viable child protective systems. In
almost all states, child protective responsibility has been blurred.
Responsibility to ensure that reports are promptly and effectively
investigated and that treatment efforts are initiated is often
dispersed among a number of public and private agencies which
have many other, often conflicting, duties competing for scarce
resources and attention. The result has been breakdowns in
communication, delays in the implementation of case plans, and an
absence of accountability for the ultimate handling of cases.
Many child protective agencies have been unable to fulfill the
life-saving responsibilities assigned to them. After receiving a report
of suspected abuse or neglect, the protective agency's investigation
must determine whether the child is in danger and what services
should be offered to the family. But because abuse or neglect usually
happen in the privacy of the home, without any witnesses, gathering
information about what happened can be exceedingly difficult. If the
parents are looking for help, they may tell the worker what
happened, but often they deny any wrongdoing. The worker must
then seek whatever information is available from schools, neighbors,
relatives, as well as the source of the report. As a result, caseworkers
have great difficulty in getting genuine information about families.
The staggering responsibilities placed on protective workers, and the
unique skills demanded by protective work, require protective
agencies to have a specialized, highly qualified staff with sufficient
resources to handle the complexities of child maltreatment cases.
Yet, many agencies are too understaffed to handle the reports they
receive, the number of which increases each year. Furthermore, most
agencies are plagued with staff turnovers as high as 100% every year
or so, making it all but impossible to develop and maintain qualified
215
staffs.
The strengthening of reporting requirements during the last
decade has had detrimental effects on the functioning of some child
protective agencies and on the welfare of families enmeshed in the
system. Some reporting laws were enacted without ensuring that a
system existed to respond to the reports generated by the law. 216 The
215. See U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, STANDARD 11.7 (1976) (commentary) (Sup. Doc. No. Y3.C86:2J98)
[hereinafter cited as U.S. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS].

216. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 21-25 (1966) (current version at ALA. CODE tit. 27,
§§ 20-25 (Supp. 1975)); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (Supp. 1966) (current
version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-546.01 (Supp. 1977)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.403 (West Supp. 1965) (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.403 (West
1974)); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1)-(s) (Supp. 1965) (current version at MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§25.248(1)-(16) (Supp. 1976)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4330 (Supp. 1965)
(current version at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-24 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978)).
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purpose of reporting known and suspected child abuse and neglect is
to bring endangered children, who might otherwise go unprotected,
quickly to the attention of agencies who are able to help them and
their families. Increased reporting is meaningless, and often actually
harmful to the children and families involved, if sufficient services
are not available to deal with the problems revealed.
Hence, the most important aspect of recent child protective
legislation is its emphasis on the development of expanded and
strengthened helping services to respond to increased reporting. A
number of states have sought to upgrade the child protective services
offered by public child welfare agencies by statutorily designating a
single agency to be responsible for all aspects of initial child
protective work, including receipt of reports, investigations, and case
disposition. 217 This is a marked departure from eariler statutes that,
basically, only provided for reporting. 218 This recent legislation
recognizes that unless a system is established to handle the
increased number of cases that inevitably flows from an improved
reporting law, stricter reporting requirements and improved reporting techniques can actually work to the detriment of agency and
family welfare. Perhaps the most significant aspect of recent
legislation has been the degree to which it has detailed the specific
responsibilities and functions of child protective agencies. 219

217. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 423(1) (McKinney 1976).
218. E.g., statutes cited note 216 supra.
219. For example, the New York statute provides:
Each child protective service shall:
1. receive on a twenty-four, seven day a week basis all reports of suspected
child abuse or maltreatment in accordance with this title, the local plan for the
provision of child protective services and the regulations of the commissioner;
2. maintain and keep up-to-date a local child abuse and maltreatment
register of all cases reported under this title together with any additional
information obtained and a record of the final disposition of the report including
services offered and accepted;
3. upon the receipt of each written report made pursuant to this title,
transmit, forthwith, a copy thereof to the state central register of child abuse and
maltreatment. In addition, not later than seven days after receipt of the initial
report, the child protective service shall send a preliminary written report of the
initial investigation, including evaluation and actions taken or contemplated, to
the state central register. Follow-up reports shall be made at regular intervals
thereafter . . . to the end that the state central register is kept fully informed and
up-to-date concerning the handling of reports;
4. give telephone notice and forward immediately a copy of reports made
pursuant to this title which involve the death of a child to the appropriate district
attorney. In addition, a copy of any or all reports made pursuant to this title
shall be forwarded immediately by the child protective service to the appropriate
district attorney if a prior request in writing for such copies has been made to the
service by the district attorney;
5. forward an additional copy of each report to the appropriate duly
incorporated society for the prevention of cruelty to children or other duly
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In the past, the enactment of expanded reporting laws was
assumed to be the cure for a state's child abuse and neglect
problems. 220 But sharply increased case loads, which inexorably flow
from strengthened reporting, come as a rude shock to social service
systems and state and local administrators. By fully and honestly
describing the investigative and treatment services necessary to
support a strong reporting law, contemporary child protective
legislation seeks to ensure that everyone considering the enactment
of such laws also appreciates the need for expanded services, and
increased funding, to accompany expanded reporting. All elements
of the community should be clearly and unambiguously prepared for
the full costs of an effective child abuse and neglect prevention and
treatment program. Only if the real issues of prevention and
treatment are faced openly can sufficient community and profes-

authorized child protective agency if a prior request for such copies has been
made to the service in writing by the society or agency;
6. upon receipt of such report, commence or cause the appropriate society
for the prevention of cruelty to children to commence, within twenty-four hours,
an appropriate investigation which shall include an evaluation of the environment of the child named in the report and any other children in the same home
and a determination of the risk to such children if they continue to remain in the
existing home environment, as well as a determination of the nature, extent, and
cause of any condition enumerated in such report, the name, age and condition of
other children in the home, and, after seeing to the safety of the child or children,
forthwith notify the subjects of the report in writing, of the existence of the report
and their rights pursuant to this title in regard to amendment or expungement;
7. determine, within ninety days, whether the report is "indicated" or
"unfounded";
8. take a child into protective custody to protect him from further abuse or
maltreatment when appropriate and in accordance with the provisions of the
family court act;
9. based on the investigation and evaluation conducted pursuant to this*
title, offer to the family of any child believed to be suffering from abuse or
maltreatment such services for its acceptance or refusal, as appear appropriate
for either the child or the family or both; provided, however, that prior to offering
such services to a family, explain that it has no legal authority to compel such
family to receive said services, but may inform the family of the obligations and
authority of the child protective service to petition the family court for a
determination that a child is in need of care and protection;
10. in those cases in which an appropriate offer of services is refused and the
child protective service determines or if the service for any other appropriate
reason determines that the best interests of the child require family court or
criminal court action, initiate the appropriate family court proceeding or make a
referral to the appropriate district attorney, or both;
11. assist the family court or criminal court during all stages of the court
proceeding in accordance with the purposes of this title and the family court act;
12. coordinate, provide or arrange for and monitor, as authorized by the
social services law, the family court act and by this title, rehabilitative services
for children and their families on a voluntary basis or under a final or
intermediate order of the family court.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw. § 424 (McKinney 1976).
220. See Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child:
The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 CAL. W.L. REV. 16, 18-19 (1976-77).
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sional support be developed for the needed long term effort. To do
less would be irresponsible and indefensible.
This recent focus on the development of investigative and
treatment services is expensive, and, as a result, injects controversy
into the legislative and reform process. Many question the wisdom of
legislating the provision of investigative and treatment services.
They argue that the services prescribed by child protection laws
could be implemented administratively, through the promulgation of
new agency regulations and the establishment of additional service
programs. However, the probable success of such an approach is
unlikely given the past inability of program managers to mobilize
sufficient support to improve services. In light of the weaknesses in
existing child protective service programs, it seems that legislative
enactment of improved service programs is essential for the
development of effective, statewide child protective systems.
The "Purpose" clause of the Model Child Protection Act is an
amalgam of these different concerns. It provides, in part:
Abused and neglected children in this state urgently need
protection. It is the purpose of this Act to help save them from
further injury and harm. This Act seeks to establish a fair and
effective state and local child protection system by providing
those procedures and services necessary to safeguard the wellbeing and development of endangered children and to preserve
and stabilize family life, whenever appropriate. 221
After the initial child protective intervention, efforts to preserve
and improve family stability are, and must remain, the domain of
community resources and agencies that have broader and more long
range responsibilities towards children and families than do child
protective agencies. Reporting should not be used as an excuse to
divest these agencies of their traditional responsibilities. Instead,
every effort must be made to encourage existing agencies to assume
greater prevention and treatment responsibility and to expand their
capacity to do so.
XIII. CHILD PROTECTION TEAMS
Child abuse and neglect derive from a wide range of social and
psychological problems that cannot be managed by one discipline or
one profession alone. Social workers, physicians, nurses, lawyers,
judges, psychiatrists, teachers, and many others must all work
together if the cycle of abuse and neglect is to be broken. But helping
221.

MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT

§2 (Aug. 1977 draft).
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efforts remain fragmented among various disciplines; communication and coordination are high-sounding watchwords that are
difficult to implement, and fear and hostility among competing
social agencies and approaches are constant obstacles impeding

service delivery.
Although the weight of the literature and developing statutory
law agree in assigning prime child protective responsibility to
222
designated social service agencies - "child protective agencies"

optimal diagnostic and treatment efforts require the contributions of
a broad range of professional and community agencies. In many
parts of the country, the creation of interdisciplinary teams - based

on the original Denver model 2 23 - has succeeded in bringing the
collective expertise of relevant professionals to bear on identification
and treatment. Depending on the community and circumstances of
individual cases, such teams include representatives of relevant
medical, mental health, law enforcement, and social service
agencies. Five states specifically mandate and three others permit
224
the creation of such interdisciplinary child protection teams.

222. See notes 208-19 and accompanying text supra.
223. See Fontana, supra note 151, at 448; see, e.g., THE BATTERED CHILD, supra
note 4.
224. Colorado law, which is the most extensive of such legislation, provides:
(6)(a) It is the intent of the general assembly to encourage the creation of one
or more child protection teams in each county or contiguous group of counties. In
each county in which reports of fifty or more incidents of child abuse have been
made to the state central registry in any one year, the county director shall cause
a child protection team to be inaugurated in the next following year.
(b) The child protection team shall review the files and other records of
the case, including the diagnostic, prognostic, and treatment services being
offered to the family in connection with the reported abuse, and shall make a
report to the county department with suggestions for further action or stating
that the child protection team has no suggestions. Contiguous counties may
cooperate in meeting the requirements of this subsection (6).
(7) The county director shall appoint a representative recommended by the
local law enforcement agencies, and a person shall be assigned by the presiding
judge of the juvenile court or the district court with juvenile jurisdiction as a
representative of the court. All other members shall be appointed by the county
director. All members shall serve at the pleasure of the county director.
(8) The county director or his designee shall be deemed to be the local
coordinator of the child protection team. In those counties in which child
protection teams meeting the requirements of this article are currently
functioning, they shall be recognized, with the consent of all members, as the
functioning child protection team for that county.
(9) The local coordinator in each county shall forward a copy of all reports of
child abuse to the child protection team. The coordinator shall forward a copy of
the investigatory report and all relevant materials to the child protection team as
soon as they become available. The child protection team shall meet no later
than one week after receipt of a report to evaluate such report of child abuse. The
local coordinator shall make and complete, within ninety days of receipt of a
report initiating an investigation of a case of child abuse, a follow-up report
including services offered and accepted and any recommendations of the child
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XIV. CENTRAL REGISTERS OF CHILD PROTECTION CASES
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have established
some kind of central register of child protection cases in order to
improve case diagnosis and monitoring or statistical systems, or
both.225 Forty states have established their central registers through
legislation, 226 while the others have established them by administrative decision. 227 One writer has noted:
In 1973, 33 states mandated central registeries by law, while
registries were maintained administratively in 13 other states
and the District of Columbia. This in turn compares to 19
mandated registries and 26 administrative ones in 1970. The
trend is clearly to enact into law228a central registry that was in
most cases already functioning.
Although the central register in most states is maintained by the
state social service agency, in California, it is maintained by a law
229
enforcement agency, the Bureau of Criminal Identification.
Verifying to a certitude reports of suspected child abuse or
neglect is almost always difficult; often it is impossible. Even the
most thorough investigation may not reveal clear evidence of what
happened; a medical report describing severe physical injuries that
protection team to the state central registry on forms supplied by the state
department for that purpose.
(10) In the event that the local department of the child protection team
initiates a petition in the juvenile court or the district court with juvenile
jurisdiction on behalf of the child who is the subject of a report, the coordinator
shall notify, in writing, the guardian ad litem appointed by the court under
section 19-10-113 to represent the child's interest. Such notice shall include:
(a) The reason for initiating the petition;
(b) Suggestions as to the optimum disposition of this particular case;
and
(c) Suggested therapeutic treatment and social services available within
the community for the subject child and the responsible person.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-109(6)-(10) (Supp. 1975).
The following statutes mandate the creation of inter-disciplinary child
protection teams: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1583(B) (West Supp. 1977); MICH. COMP.
LAws. ANN. § 722.629(1) (Supp. 1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.145(6) (Vernon Supp.
1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2216(d) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 40-11-8 (Supp. 1976). The following states permit the creation of these teams:
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18951(d), 18960(f) (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT.

§§ 19-10-103(2), -109(6) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE § 63.1-248.6(E) (Supp. 1977).
225. The exceptions are Minnesota, New Mexico and Utah.
226. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(7) (West 1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-2 (1968);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1506 (1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422 (McKinney 1976 & Supp.
1976).

227. See DEFRANCIS & LUCHT, supra note 5, at 178.
228. G. DAHL, supra note 12, at 10.
229. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11110 (West Supp. 1977) (records to be maintained by the
Department of Justice).
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suggest child abuse may not establish a connection between the
parents and the condition of the child. In most cases, then, the
protective worker must form an opinion about whether or not the
report appears to be valid. The opinion will be based upon certain
signs or indicators including 1) the child's or sibling's physical
condition, 2) the child's or sibling's behavior or demeanor, 3) the
parent's behavior or demeanor, 4) the family's home situation, and 5)
the prior history of the family, including previous suspicious injuries
to the child or siblings.
Often, the most crucial factor in the diagnosis and evaluation of
child abuse and neglect situations is the circumstantial evidence
showing a pattern of previous suspicious injuries. Since child abuse
23°
and neglect are usually part of a repetitive or continuing pattern,
information concerning the existence of prior injuries or other
manifestations of abuse or neglect can assist physicians and
protective workers in determining whether an injury is an isolated
accident or one of a series of injuries suggesting abuse or neglect.
Knowledge of a previous incident, similar in kind, can turn doubt
into relative certainty. Unfortunately, because health and social
service agencies in most communities are fragmented and because
abusing parents often take their children to different doctors or
hospitals to treat the injuries they inflict, a cumulative record of
prior suspicious injuries and social service treatment efforts is not
ordinarily available. 31 By maintaining a community-wide or
statewide record 232 of prior reports and treatment efforts and their
outcomes, a central register can provide immediate, concrete
assistance to child protective workers and others who need such
information to assess the danger to a child whom they suspect is
233
being abused or neglected.
Furthermore, even after protective workers, physicians, and law
enforcement officials determine that a child is or seems to be abused
and neglected, they often cannot assess the immediate danger to the
child or the treatment needs of the family. Knowledge of previous
reports and their outcome can help in evaluating the seriousness of
230. See Fontana, supra note 151, at 451.
231. See generally Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children in THE BATrERED
CHILD, supra note' 4, at 192.
232. It appears certain that there will be no attempt to form a national central
register. Fears of civil liberties complaints together with developing evidence that
cross-state information is not necessary except in metropolitan areas that span two or
more states make it clear that there will be no real effort in this direction for the
foreseeable future.
233. See Paulsen, The Law and Abused Children in THE BATrERED CHILD, supra
note 4, at 192-93; text accompanying notes 225-32 supra; text accompanying notes
234-42 infra.
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the family's situation and can be an important factor in determining
whether the child is in such danger that he should be removed
234
immediately from his home.

Perhaps equally as important, if a central register monitors how
reports are handled, it can help ensure that investigations are
properly performed and that services are provided. If a register can
receive and process reports immediately, and if it can review them
for their timeliness, it can monitor and measure the system's overall
performance while at the same time presenting at least a partial
picture of the problems with which the system must deal. And, as a
research tool, a register can help determine the incidence, of abuse
and neglect in a state or community and the impact of different
types of treatment. Once information from a properly functioning
register is available, the rational evaluation of agency and human
needs can begin.
To summarize, a properly operated central register can:
1) assist in diagnosis and evaluation by providing or
locating information on suspicious occurrences and prior
treatment efforts;
2) improve the handling of child abuse and neglect cases
by providing convenient consultation on case handling to
workers and potential reporters;
3) refine diagnosis and encourage further reporting by
providing feedback to those who have made reports;
4) measure the performance of the child protective service
by monitoring follow-up reports;
5) coordinate community-wide treatment efforts by monitoring follow-up reports;
6) facilitate research, planning, and program development
by providing statistical data on the nature and handling of
reports; and
7) encourage the reporting of suspected child abuse and
neglect by providing a focus for public and professional
educational campaigns.
However, nothing is so striking as the failure of almost all
existing central register systems to fulfill their stated diagnostic,
case monitoring, and statistical functions. Nothing is more disappointing than to visit a much heralded central register, as this writer
has, only to find it hopelessly overwhelmed by a flood of cases. With
insufficient professional and clerical staff, too few telephone lines to
enable those calling to reach the register, and too little space in
234. See generally id.
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which to store the reports received, these registers are unprepared for
the veritable avalanche of paperwork a widely advertised reporting
law can generate. They are, therefore, immobilized from the day they
open. Indeed, there is sometimes a tendency to exploit a register to
give the appearance of improving services without spending the
really large amounts of money needed truly to do so.
In their present condition, all but a few registers are unused and
unusable. The records in them are grievously incomplete, inaccurate, and out-of-date, making the central register a largely ignored
appendage of the state's child protection system, one whose
existence no one can easily justify. No state can point to more than a
handful of instances in which a professional sought a register's
assistance in diagnosing suspicious circumstances; 235 most states
236
cannot point to even one instance.
Most central registers are also unable to fulfill their research
and statistical purposes because they provide one-dimensional,
statistical summaries that offer only the roughest profile of limited
segments of the protective process in their community or state. The
forms used by most protective agencies to send information to the
register are brief, containing little more than the rudimentary data
mandated by the child abuse reporting law. 237 Hence, the only

statistics usually available describe the total number of cases
reported, the ages of the children involved, the type of alleged abuse
and neglect, the source of the report, and, sometimes, the alleged
perpetrator. But this information offers little understanding about
the children and families involved; missing are the vital and
sensitive data that would explore and document patterns of abuse
and neglect and variations in family status, treatment programs,
and dispositional alternatives. Because of complicated and fragmented reporting procedures, many reports received by child
protective agencies or the police are never forwarded to the central
register. 238 In some states, failure to provide printed forms for
making uniform reports to the register is an additional obstacle to
collecting complete data. 239 The scope of many registers is further
narrowed because only cases formally handled through the child

235. Data on file at the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.
236. Id.
237. But see NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE, National
Standard Form, reprinted in D. WALTERS, PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL ABUSE OF
CHILDREN 181-84 app. (1975).
238. Data on file at the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Washington, D.C.
239. Id.
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abuse reporting law are recorded, 240 thus excluding "nonmandated
reports"'241 and reports made to other agencies. Thus, most registers

cannot reveal even elementary operational needs.
The absence of updated or follow-up information which would
indicate whether the initial report was valid is another grave
shortcoming of most existing register systems - one with great
potential for harm. In order for a central register to perform its
possible diagnostic, case monitoring, and statistical functions, its
contents must accurately reflect the handling of child protective
cases in the community. A register should receive all reports of
known and suspected child abuse and neglect made to all agencies in
a community that serve a child protective function, and it must have
current information on the handling of cases through a series of
follow-up reports. Otherwise, protective workers and other professionals will be unable to rely on the register to disclose prior reports
or the status of past treatment efforts, administrators will be unable
to rely on the register to measure agency performance, and planners
will be unable to rely on the register to assess programmatic needs.
The storing of raw, unvalidated data in a register presents
another serious problem because it infringes on the civil rights of
those individuals and families listed in it. But even when follow-up
reports are used to keep a central register up-to-date, a register can
still represent a potential threat to the privacy of children and
families listed. Many of the reports received, stored, and242made easily
accessible by central registers prove to be unfounded.
The usual response to these civil rights concerns is to say that
protecting innocent young children is more important than safeguarding the rights of abusing parents. Indeed, there are legitmate
and pressing needs to maintain information in central registers, and
the only way to eradicate all danger of inappropriate disclosure of
reports would be to abandon their use. But the necessity of storing
this information should not forestall efforts to prevent its misuse.
While designed to protect helpless and endangered children, the law
and the register can also protect children's and families' legitimate
rights to privacy. All of the civil libertarian criticisms of central
registers, except for the one based on a fear of data banks in general,
243
can be met by intelligent planning.
240. See, e.g., N.Y. SELECT COMM. REP., supra note 7, at 31.
241. Id. Reports are termed "nonmandated" either because the person making the
report is not "mandated" by the reporting law to do so or because the nature of the
abuse or neglect is not within the definition of the law.
242. See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
243. See generally Symposium, Computerized Criminal Justice Information
Systems: A Recognition of the Competing Interests, 22 VILL. L. REV. 1171 (1977).
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Yet, in most states, the subjects of reports are not informed that
their names have been entered in the central register; they are not
permitted to see the file that alleges derogatory things about them;
they cannot have removed from the register charges that have
proven to be untrue or unfounded; and they have no right to appeal
to a higher administrative authority. 244 Often, there is no provision
to ensure the security or confidentiality of the data collected,
although the state eligibility requirements of the Federal Act have
begun to change this in the forty-two states and jurisdictions so far
245
eligible.
Persons listed in the register should have the statutory right to
review the contents of the record on them 246 and to make appropriate
247
application to amend or remove information from the register. If
their application is denied, they should have a right to a court
hearing. 248 In addition, if reports prove to be unfounded or otherwise
invalid, the record should be sealed automatically or all identifying
information concerning the subjects of the report should be removed
automatically from the register. 249 Finally, there should be provision
for criminal and civil liability for the unauthorized disclosure of
25
information in the register. 0
The need most difficult to satisfy is the need to seal, expunge, or
remove invalid reports from central registers. The need to remove
records is perceived to be greater in relation to such centralized data
banks than to local agency records. 25 1 There is a need to develop a
reasonable and predictable method for determining whether reports
should be removed from the register which is fair to endangered
children as well as to accused parents. Unfortunately, contemporary
child protective practices are not easily accommodated to this need.
In the past, caseworkers did not have to determine the validity of
reports before offering help, and, indeed, they still often attempt to
avoid this difficult decision because the directed questioning and
25 2
negative labelling of parents can be destructive to treatment.
When workers are unable or unwilling to make a decision, they
may try to shortcut the process of decision and avoid confronting the
parent, by convincing the parents through persuasion or threats or
244. See notes 246-50 and accompanying text infra.
245. See text accompanying notes 258-61 infra.
246. See MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT § 21 (Aug. 1977 draft); see, e.g., N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 422(7) (McKinney 1976).
247. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(8) (McKinney 1976).
248. Id.
249. See, e.g., id. § 422(5).
250. See, e.g., id. § 422(10).
251. See text accompanying notes 278-80 infra.
252. See text accompanying notes 127-28 supra.
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misrepresentation to accept services "voluntarily" - including
"voluntary" placement of the child in foster care, or they may shift
the onus of decision by referring the case to juvenile court for a
judicial decision.
To protect family rights, recent statutory and administrative
changes force the worker to make a prompt formal decision
concerning the report's validity. Usually the child protective service
is required to report to the central register within a specified time its
determination of whether the report was "indicated" or "unfounded. ' 253 States differ on the test to be applied in determining the
validity of the report, from "probable cause" 254 to "some credible
255
evidence."
Central registers are easy to criticize because they raise genuine
concerns over unwarranted recordkeeping and potential "Big
Brotherism" and because in the past, most have not proven useful.
But those who say central registers are dangerous or do not work
make a serious miscalculation based on a misunderstanding of their
nature and functions. A central register is fundamentally nothing
more than an index of cases handled by an agency or a number of
agencies. Those who advocate the abolition of central registers do
not realize that all agencies -

as bureaucratic institutions -

must

have an index of cases if they are to function in any organized
fashion whatsoever. Without an index, or register, there would be no
way of knowing if a case is currently being handled by an agency
unless every member of the agency's staff were polled individually
each time a letter or referral arrived at the agency. Each worker
would then have to consult his own individual index of cases or rely
on his memory. Such a chaotic arrangement would cause far greater
harm to children and families needing help. So there can be no
question about the need for a register; no agency could do without a
master index.
The failings in the establishment and operation of most central
registers have made them legitimate targets for criticism. Nevertheless, a central register, properly designed and adequately operated,
can be a prime tool for the immediate and long term improvement of
a child protection system. Central registers take on their character 253. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 424(7) (McKinney 1976).
254. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. §110-19(2) (1975) (removal justified where
investigation reveals abuse or neglect) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2214(h) (Purdon
Cum. Supp. 1977-1978 (same) with TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1205 (1977) ("reasonable

grounds to believe").
255. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.* § 42-818(A)(5) (Supp. 1975) ("some credible evidence");
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.627(2) (Supp. 1977) ("credible evidence"); N.Y. Soc.
SERV. LAW § 422(5) (McKinney 1976) ("some credible evidence").
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either good or bad - either successful or unsuccessful - according
to the data they contain, how the data is maintained, who has access
to the data, and how those who have access to the data use it.256
XV.

PROVISIONS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS

The rights and sensibilities of families named in child protective
records must be protected, for these records contain information
about the most private aspects of personal and family life. Whether
or not the information is true, improper disclosure could stigmatize
25 7
the future of all those mentioned in the report.
In order to qualify for funding under the Federal Act, a state
must "provide for methods to preserve the confidentiality of all
records in order to protect the rights of the child, his parents or
guardians. ' 25 8 Under the regulations that implement this section,259
a state must have a law "which makes such records confidential and
which makes any person who permits or encourages the unauthorized dissemination of their contents guilty of a crime." 26° Largely
under this impetus, states have moved rapidly in the last three years
to provide specific legislative blankets of confidentiality; at least
261
forty states now make unauthorized disclosure a misdemeanor.
Nevertheless, the information in child abuse and neglect records
must be available to those who need to make critical child protective
decisions. The question is: Who should have access to these records?
Limiting access necessarily limits use, while broadening access
increases the possibility of misuse.
In general, states take three approaches to access to records.
Some statutes prohibit access to anyone outside the child protective
agency; 262 others make the records confidential, but authorize the
responsible state agency to issue regulations allowing some persons
access, 26 3 and others enumerate who has access in the statute
itself.264 As a general rule, states that allow exceptions follow the

256. See Symposium, supra note 243.
257. See text accompanying note 245 supra.

258. 42 U.S.C. §5103(b)(2)(E) (Supp. V 1975).
259. 45 C.F.R. § 1430.3-1 (1976).
260. Id. § 1340-3(d)(5).
261. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 22(3) (Supp. 1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-818(10)
(Supp. 1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(10) (McKinney 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1356(c) (Supp. 1977).
262. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:65(F)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
263. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2061, 5035.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:6-8.11 (West 1976).
264. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2331(b) (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.15 (West Supp.
1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(4) (McKinney Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.44.070 (Supp. 1977).
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long standing approach taken in the regulations 265 implementing
Title IV of the Social Security Act.26 6 These permit access for
purposes directly connected with the administration of the program.267 The regulations implementing the Federal Act enumerate

the specific persons, officials, and agencies and the specific
situations under which the access is deemed directly connected with
268
the administration of the child protective program.
Theoretically, any person who must decide whether a child is
abused or neglected would find information about prior suspicious
occurrences and prior treatment efforts helpful in reaching a
decision. For this reason, a number of states give access to the
central register and other child protective records to all persons who
are required to report cases of child abuse and neglect. 269 However,
when such a large number of strangers have access to records,
guarding against unauthorized disclosure of information is all but
impossible. More importantly, such enormous and widespread access
to personal and family data unreasonably compromises the right of
privacy of the children and families involved. Some professionals
also see a danger that many of those who would be given such
information might not know how to evaluate it intelligently; a
potential reporter, for example, might allow the presence or absence
of a prior record to influence his actions inordinately.
Although the sharing of information between professionals, as
will be discussed below, 270 is often a suitable alternative to direct
access to records, it is impractical when the protective worker, police
officer, or physician needs the information immediately or in the
middle of the night. 271 Therefore, carefully designated professionals
who have responsibility for making decisions about protective
custody, are often given direct access to information at the time they
265. 45 C.F.R. 205.50(a)(1)(i) (1976).
266. See 42 U.S.C. §601-44 (Supp. V 1975). The Social Security Act and the
Federal Act are both aaministered by the Department of Health, Education and

Welfare. See 42 U.S.C. §301 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. V 1975); note 9 supra.
267. 45 C.F.R: § 205.50(a)(1)(i) (1976).
268. Id. § 1340.3-3(d)(5).
269. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE Art. 27, §35A(i) (1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§51E (West Supp. 1977).
270. See text accompanying note 276 infra.
271. For instance, a physician seeing a bruised or emaciated child in a hospital
emergency room must not only decide whether there is sufficient cause to report but
must also decide whether the child should be placed in protective custody. One aspect
of such a doctor's dilemma is the need to evaluate the risk that may be incurred if a
child is taken home before a protective worker can visit the family. An equally serious
problem, particularly for urban hospitals, is posed by the knowledge that, once
returned to the parents' custody, the child and family might disappear into the
anonymity of the city. In both situations, it can be crucial for the physician to know
about prior treatment efforts and the prior history of the family. See also notes 168-72
and accompanying text supra.
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need it most - when they may be making a life or death decision.
Depending on the state, these professionals include child protective
workers, 272 law enforcement officials, 273 physicians in at least
twenty states, 274 and other persons authorized to place a child in
275
protective custody.
Direct access to the records for all other professionals coming in
contact with abused and neglected children is not necessary.
Protective workers can share relevant information with other
appropriate agencies and professionals as a cooperative treatment
plan is being developed. Professionals who know and trust each
other should be able to discuss a case in their professional
capacities. 276 Treatment agencies, such as foster care agencies, also
need a clear picture of family history in order to develop and
implement successful treatment strategies. For this reason, many
states specifically authorize their access to the information in these
277
records.
As a matter of fundamental fairness, if not constitutional right,
persons alleged to abuse or neglect their children ought to know
what information a government agency is keeping about them. 278

Subjects of a report should have access to it because 1) they have a
right to know what allegations against them have been recorded by
a public agency, even though the record is confidential, and 2) only if
they know what is in the record can they pursue their legal rights to

272. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3859(2)(I) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW
§ 422(4) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
273. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §235A.15(2)(c) (West Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.5045(3)(D) (1975); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.770(1) (1975).
274. E.g., GA. CODE §§ 99-4302(b)(1) (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(i) (1976);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.770(1) (1975).
275. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-115(2) (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.627(1)(D) (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(4)(b) (McKinney Supp.

1976).
276. In keeping with this approach, the Model Act provides:
(b) No person, official, or agency shall have access to such records unless in
furtherance of the. purposes directly connected with the administration of this
Act. Such persons, officials, agencies, and purposes for access include:
(i) a local child protective service in the furtherance of its responsibili-

ties under this Act;
(ii) a police or law enforcement agency investigating a report of known
or suspected child abuse or neglect;
(iii) a physician who has before him a child whom he reasonably
suspects may be abused or neglected;
(iv) a person legally authorized to place a child in protective custody
when such person requires the information in the report or record to
determine whether to place the child in protective custody.
MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT § 24(b)(i) -(iv) (Aug. 1977 draft).
277. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(7) (West 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.627(1)(e) (Supp. 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5045(3)(c) (1975).
278. See text accompanying notes 245-49 supra; text accompanying note 279 infra.
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have the record amended, expunged, or removed from the register
279
and other agency files.
Perhaps the greatest controversy surrounds the opening of child
abuse and neglect records to program administrators, legislators,
and researchers in pursuit of their official or professional responsibilities to plan, monitor, audit, and evaluate services or to conduct
other research. Some observers have suggested that if those outside
of designated investigatory and service agencies are given access to
records, the identifying information in the records should be
expunged. 2 s° But numerous types of important research, including
longitudinal studies and cross-agency studies, require charting the
movement of cases as they travel through time or among agencies.
Such studies are crucial in gauging the effectiveness of different
treatment techniques, and they cannot be performed without
information that identifies the case and the individuals in it.
If child abuse and neglect records are to be used to improve
services through monitoring and research, it is imperative that the
data collected so painstakingly and at such great expense be
available to outsiders, including academic policy-planners, legislators and researchers. To do otherwise would deprive these policymakers of information on how the system actually works and, in the
case of higher level administrators and legislators, lack of access
would prevent them from acting as informal "ombudsmen" in
specific cases. Moreover, child protective agencies need the expertise
of universities and other institutions and groups for advice and
28
assistance. '
Confidentiality can be exploited to shield the malfunctioning of
an agency as well as to protect the privacy of individuals. Various
advocate organizations have been denied access to their client's
records on the false grourid of confidentiality - even when they need
the records to protect their client's rights by showing a pattern of
bias or discrimination. Recently, lawyers in New York City were
denied access to the records of their clients which, they claimed,
would prove a pattern of religious and racial discrimination by foster
279. See, e.g., D.C.

CODE

§ 16-2331(c)(2) (1973) (according right to inspect record to

attorney for parent, guardian, custodian); IOWA CODE ANN. § 235A.19(i) (West Supp.
1977) (same); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(4)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1976) (individual

subjects right to inspect record). For a further discussion of these issues, see text
accompanying notes 245-55 supra.
280. See also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.07(7) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, § 3860
(Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1506 (1975); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 422(4)(h)
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
281. Those outside the system generally have greater freedom to question longaccepted assumptions, to explore new modes of action, and to conduct long range
research that might lead to basic changes in the structure and function of institutions.
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care agencies. A court order was necessary to obtain the information
sought. 282 Legitimate concerns for privacy can be met with adequate
provisions to ensure that disclosure of information to outsiders is
strictly limited to situations in which the need for personal
identifiers is essential to the research purpose and the information
28 3
will not be improperly shared with others.
XVI.

PROVISIONS FOR REPORTS OF INSTITUTIONAL
CHILD MALTREATMENT

More often than we would like to admit, children are abused and
neglected by the institutions meant to care for them. Recognizing
this form of maltreatment, the regulations implementing the Federal
Act define a "person responsible for a child's care" to include "the
child's parent, guardian, or other person responsible for the child's
health or welfare, whether in the same home as the child, a relative's
' 28 4
home, a foster care home, or a residential institution.
The inclusion of cases of institutional maltreatment in residential settings is based on two considerations. First, children are more
vulnerable in foster homes, shelters, and other residential facilities
because parents may be out of touch, uncaring, or deceased.-Only a
child protective agency would be sufficiently concerned about the
child's welfare or would be able to take effective action. Second,
when a child has been placed in an agency or home, whether or not
with the parent's consent, that agency is as responsible for the
child's welfare as any natural parent would be.
Investigating reports of suspected institutional abuse raises
special problems. When there is a report of institutional maltreatment, no agency should be allowed to investigate itself.285 Thus, for
example, the federal regulations specifically require that if there are
allegations of institutional abuse or neglect, "an agency other than
the agency, institution or facility involved in the acts or omissions"
282. See generally Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D. N.Y. 1974).
283. See MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT §§ 24(b), (d) (Aug. 1977 draft).
284. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1340.1-2(b)(3) (1976) (emphasis added). It is important to note
that these regulations restrict the definition of institutional abuse and neglect to
residential situations. While the federal government and others are concerned about
the care of children in nonresidential settings, problems such as unreasonable
corporal punishment in the schools, however serious they may be, are not child abuse
and neglect within the commonly accepted meaning of these terms.
285. An outside, disinterested agency must perform the investigation and it must
have sufficient authority to make meaningful corrective action. Since the child
protective agency is administratively linked to residential institutions in many
jurisdictions, an investigation by the child protective agency, like one by the
institution itself, might be perceived as something less than independent and
objective. To provide assurance that the investigation will be thorough and fair, and
that it also will appear to be fair, it is essential that an administratively separate
agency conduct it.
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must investigate the situation. 28 6 Largely as the result of this
requirement, at least forty states now have a special procedure
which ensures that no agency will police itself in the investigation of
2
reports of institutional maltreatment. 87
XVII.

LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The involuntary intrusion into family life by courts and child
protective agencies can have profoundly important consequences for
the children and parents involved. The process itself can be a
frightening experience that may ultimately result in the children
being removed from their parents and placed in foster care or
institutions for months or years. In a few cases, children are
permanently removed from their parents and placed for adoption.
A.

Counsel For The Child Or Guardian Ad Litem

Since the interests of parents and children often conflict in child
protective cases, it is important that the child's interest in a safe
home environment be represented before the court.288 Partly as the
result of the work and writings of Brian Fraser, 28 9 Congress required
that states provide a "guardian ad litem to represent the interests of
abused and neglected children in judicial proceedings. ' ' 290 Unfortunately, there has been some question about whether a child should
be represented by a guardian ad litem or by an attorney. There is
some imprecision in using the term "guardian ad litem," since it
does not require that the guardian be a lawyer, and indeed under
traditional practice the guardian ad litem would not be an
attorney. 291 Hence, the regulations implementing the act do not
require that the guardian be an attorney. 292 Nevertheless, although a

286. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(d)(3) (1976).
287. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 27, §20(1).(4) (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. §38-721 (Supp.
1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1204 (Supp. 1977). Michigan law provides a good
example:
If there is reasonable cause to suspect that a child in the care of or under the
control of a public or private agency, institution, or facility is an abused or
neglected child, the agency, institution, or facility, shall be investigated by an
agency administratively independent of the agency, institution, or facility being
investigated.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.628(4) (Supp. 1977).

288. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 220, at 27.

289. See generally id.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (Supp. V 1975).
291. For a discussion of the role of the attorney in child abuse and an analysis of
the Pennsylvania guardian ad litem, see Redeker, The Right of an Abused Child to

Independent Counsel and the Role of the Child Advocate in Child Abuse Cases, 23
VILL. L. REv. 521 (1978).

292. 45 C.F.R. 1340.3-3(d)(7) (1976).
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lay guardian ad litem can perform important functions it is unlikely
that courts would give to the guardian the right to settle or concede a
judicial proceeding alleging abuse or neglect. But if the guardian ad
litem does not have this power, it is difficult to distinguish his role
from that of the child protective worker, unless he is a lawyer who
can represent the child's legal rights and interests. Therefore, the
Model Child Protection Act recommends that the guardian ad litem
should be an attorney assigned to protect the legal rights and to
express the wishes of children in child protective court proceedings.

293

As of this writing, at least twenty-four states provide for the
mandatory appointment of a lawyer to represent a child. 294 And at
least ten states provide for the mandatory appointment of a
guardian ad litem who need not be a lawyer, and is usually a child
protective worker or probation officer. 295 Seven more states appoint a
296
guardian ad litem in all cases as a matter of administrative policy.
B.

Counsel For The Parents

In criminal proceedings, the right to counsel for parents alleged
to have abused or neglected their children is well established. 297 But
the parent's right to counsel in juvenile or family court proceedings
is not as widely accepted. Noting the "civil" nature of child
protective proceedings, courts are divided on whether parents have a
constitutional right to counsel in such proceedings. 298 Yet, even in
civil proceedings, parents or guardians, in effect, also stand
"accused." A finding of abuse or neglect may encourage a criminal
prosecution, may result in the removal of a child from parental
custody and, ultimately, may result in the termination of parental
rights. Even if these more extreme events do not take place, the
intrusion on family rights through the proceeding itself, and the
possibility of probation or other agency supervision of the home
293. MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT § 25(a) (Aug. 1977 draft).
294. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2001 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.28 (West 1969);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
295. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §42-817 (Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§2151.281 (Page 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §40-11-14 (Supp. 1976).
296. Data on file at the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, Department
of Health, Education & Welfare, Washington, D.C.
297. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-66b, -66c (West Supp. 1976); MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.

§ 3-821 (Supp. 1977); N.M.

STAT. ANN. §

13-14-25(F) (1976).

298. Compare In re B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972)
(indigent respondent parents in child protective proceedings have a right to assigned
counsel since they face the possible loss of custody of the child) with In re Robinson, 8
Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970), cert. denied sub. nom. Kaufman v. Carter,
402 U.S. 964 (1971) (no right to appointment of counsel in civil dependency
proceeding).
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situation, are reasons enough to conclude that the liberty of parents
in child protective proceedings is at stake. 299 For these reasons,
twenty-two states provide counsel as a statutory right, even in the
absence of an apparent constitutional mandate."
C.

Counsel For The Child Protective Agency

The child protective agency also needs legal assistance when
appearing in court. Historically, prosecutors played a minor role in
child protective proceedings. 3°1 If evidence had to be collected or
witnesses called to testify, the protective worker did so. As long as
juvenile courts were informal with relaxed rules of evidence, the
petitioning protective worker did not need legal assistance. But the
expanded participation of counsel for the parents has increased the
formality of juvenile court proceedings, and protective workers
unassisted by legal counsel are at a severe disadvantage. Without
counsel to assist the worker in pretrial investigation, case preparation, petition drafting, courtroom presentation, and legal argument,
otherwise provable cases are often dismissed when the parent has
the one-sided advantage of vigorous defense counsel. 30 2 It might
seem to the parents' advantage if the protective worker's case
preparation and presentation suffer from a lack of legal assistance.
But this is not always so. Fearing that an abused child might be
returned unsafely to his parents, judges may feel the "uncomfortable
pull toward a prosecutive stance when zealous defense counsel have
elicited a one-sided development of case facts with no one to
intervene but the judge. 30° 3 Yet, if a judge becomes the advocate of
the petitioner's case, and performs the functions of the absent
prosecutor, he cannot maintain an unbiased view of the case, and he

299. Cf. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (no entitlement in parole
revocation proceedings to the type of full adversary hearing mandated in a criminal
proceeding).
300. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 5-124 (Supp. 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119,
§ 29 (West 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (West 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2151.352 (Page 1976).
301. See generally D. BESHAROV, supra note 211, at 39-43.
302. Cf. In re Lang, 44 Misc. 2d 900, 255 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Fam. Ct., N.Y. Co., 1965)
(dictum) (absence of provision for prosecuting counsel in delinquency cases presents

grave danger of dismissal merely for lack of proper presentation).
303. Skoler, Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings - A Total Criminal Justice
Perspective, 8 J. FAM. L. 243, 270 (1968). Cf. Bible v. State, 253 Ind. 373, 254 N.E.2d
319 (1970) (no right to jury trial in juvenile proceedings, the civil nature of which will
be better preserved and impressed on the child by a judge alone). For a number of
legislative proposals to deal with this question, see U.S. JUVENILE JUSTICE
STANDARDS, supra note 215, 15.1-.19; Fox, Prosecutors in the Juvenile Court: A
Statutory Proposal,8, HARV. J. LEGIS. 33 (1970); Lermert, Legislating Change in the
Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 421, 432-35.
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cannot assess the evidence impartially - or at least that will be the
appearance to those involved in the proceeding.
A few states require the presence of an attorney to assist the
petitioner in child protective proceedings. 30 4 In other states, however,
the law merely provides that the judge may request that a local
public law official assist the petitioner. 3 5 In many communities, this
function is served by the district attorney or similar criminal court
prosecutor.3 0 6 But even though many prosecutors understand and
strive to achieve the juvenile court's social purpose in child
protective cases, a number of communities use the civil law officer to
represent the child protective agency in order to minimize the
punitive nature of juvenile court proceedings. 30 7 Sometimes, the local
agency hires its own counsel or uses internal legal staff.
All attorneys representing the child protective agency must
understand the child protective system's emphasis on treatment and
ameliorative services 308 and must appreciate that their preeminent
professional, ethical,30 9 and constitutional 310 obligation is to see
justice done. In child protective proceedings, this means they must
seek to protect, fairly and honestly, the physical and legal rights of
the child. If the child's interests seem to conflict with the position of
the child protective agency, the attorney must be prepared to
disagree and to take appropriate action. 311
To establish eligibility under the Federal Act, a state may
designate as the child's guardian ad litem the
attorney charged with the presentation in a juvenile proceeding
of the evidence alleged to amount to the abuse and neglect, so
long as his legal responsibility includes representing the rights,
304. E.g.,
1976).

NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 128.100 (1975); R.I. GEN.

LAWS ANN. § 40-11-14 (Supp.

305. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-535(E) (Supp. 1976); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-1-106(3) (1974). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, §26 (West 1975).
306. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(3) (1974); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 254(b)
(McKinney 1975).
307. E.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 254 (McKinney 1975).
308. See text accompanying notes 208-21 supra.
309. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 ("The responsibility of
a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice,
not merely to convict").
310. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). According to the Brady Court:
"Society wins not when only the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair;
our system of administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly
S..
[the prosecution] wins its points whenever justice is done its citizens in the
courts." Id. at 87, quoting Address by Sol. Gen. Sobeloff, Judicial Conference of the
Fourth Circuit (June 29, 1954).
311. For example, if the agency decides that court action is required, but the
attorney concludes that there is insufficient evidence or that the child's interests
indicate court action to be inappropriate, he must be free to prevent the commencement of the proceeding, or, if it already has been commenced, to move for its
dismissal.
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interest, welfare, and well-being of the child; where such
appointments are made, the legal opinion of the State Attorney
General2 must specify that such attorney has said legal responsi31
bility.
While this may not be the best way to ensure that a child's interests
are represented before the court, it is one way to do so and a number
of states have provided written documentation that attorneys
assigned to present child protective petitions in juvenile courts have
this authority and responsibility. For example, Arizona law
provides: "The county attorney, upon the request of the court, a
governmental agency or on his own motion, may intervene in any
proceedings under this article to represent the interest of the
31 3
child."
XVIII.

PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

The keys to real progress in the prevention, identification, and
treatment of child abuse and neglect are the efforts of capable,
concerned professionals coupled with the support of an informed and
aware citizenry. Informing professionals and the general public
about child maltreatment has a twofold purpose; to encourage fuller
reporting and, to generate the public support necessary to increase
child protective services and to break bureaucratic logjams.
Until recently, however, local and state agencies have been
largely unable to mount and sustain high quality educational and
training programs. In response to this failure, at least thirteen states
have enacted specific legislative mandates requiring ongoing public
and professional education and training programs. 3 14 Furthermore,
the Federal Act requires that, in order to receive special funding, a
state must "provide for dissemination of information to the general
public with respect to the problem of child abuse and neglect and the
facilities and prevention and treatment methods available to combat
'3 15
instances of child abuse and neglect.
Educational programs seek to make those persons who are
required or permitted to report aware of the prevalence of child
maltreatment, how to identify it, and how to report it. Such
programs generally emphasize that child protective procedures are
not punitive in nature and that their purpose is to protect the child
312. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.3-3(d)(7) (1976).
313. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-535(E) (Supp. 1976).
314. E.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 235A.10 (West Supp. 1977); Ky. REV. STAT.

§ 199.900(1)

(1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.155 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 421
(McKinney 1976).
315. 42 U.S.C. §5103(b)(2)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
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and to rehabilitate the family. Efforts are also made to inform
potential reporters not only of their legal responsibilities, including
penalties for failure to report, but also of their legal rights, including
immunity from prosecution and the abrogation of privileged
communications. Professionals are also provided information on the
availability of community treatment resources and how to use them.
Finally, a growing trend in public awareness efforts is to provide
a direct message through mass media to parents who may need help
in adequately caring for their children. The messages seek to
persuade parents that they are not alone in their difficulty and to
inform them where they can get help.
It should be noted that in many states the actual reporting law
itself is an obstacle to professional and public understanding.
Numerous amendments, engrafting new procedures to existing
statutes, have made most reporting laws confusing to both lawyer
316
and laymen.
XIX.

CONCLUSION: IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

After being ignored for so long, the plight of abused and
neglected children has become the subject of widespread professional
and public concern. As a result, there has been major progress in our
ability to protect the abused and neglected child and to assist his
family. But we still face enormous gaps between what we want to do
to protect children and what we can do.
Although all fifty states have child abuse reporting laws, the
legal framework for child protective work is incomplete and
unnecessarily complex in most states, thus making it difficult to
implement effective programs successfully. Moreover, the financial
and institutional support necessary to sustain adequate treatment
and preventive services continues to be widely lacking. In almost
every community in the nation, there are major inadequacies,
breakdowns, and gaps in the child protective process. Preventive
efforts are uneven or absent; detection and reporting are haphazard
and incomplete; protective investigations are often backlogged or
poorly performed; and suitable treatment programs are almost
nonexistent for the majority of families needing them. Child
protective workers are generally not given the training, skills, and
ancillary services necessary to meet the important responsibilities
assigned to them; they have unmanageably large caseloads and
316. In many states, persons looking to the law for guidance are perplexed or

misled about their responsibilities and powers. Hence, a first priority in many states
is a simple redrafting of the reporting law to clarify its meaning and to improve its
readability.
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show rapid "worker burnout" and consequent high job turnover.
Too often, the only treatment alternatives available to them are
infrequent and largely meaningless home visits, overused foster
care, and unthinking reliance on court action. Lacking suitable long
term treatment services, most American communities are faced with
a grim choice in cases of serious abuse or neglect - either break up
families or leave the children at home without help, where they
might be seriously injured or even killed. For far too many
endangered children, the existing child protection system is
inadequate to the life-saving tasks assigned to it; too many children
and families are processed through the system with a paper promise
of help.
Yet, despite all the problems facing existing child protective
systems, their promise is great. Children can be protected and their
well-being fostered by helping parents to "parent." There are
programs in all parts of the nation helping parents to cope with the
stresses of family life in our modern society. Social casework,
psychological and psychiatric services, child abuse teams, lay
therapists, parent surrogates, day care, parents anonymous groups,
homemaker service, education for parenthood, and a wide range of
other concrete services and programs can and do make a difference
317
in the level of family functioning.
The challenge we face is not so much to discover what works; to
a great extent we know that. We must now discover how to develop
the cooperative community structures necessary to provide needed
services efficiently, effectively, and compassionately.
As a society, we have provided a combination of laws and
procedures through which professionals and private citizens who
come in contact with endangered children can, and in some
situations must, take protective action. Laws have established
reporting procedures, authorized the taking of children into protective custody, and assigned child protective responsibilities to social
agencies and the police. Laws have also created juvenile and
criminal court jurisdiction and foster treatment programs - all to
protect vulnerable children and assist families in need.
Though not a panacea for the problems of child abuse and
neglect, a law can establish the institutional framework for
concerted community-wide action. It can enunciate the philosophy
which will motivate and guide the child protective system as it deals
with individual problems of children and families. Hence, a law lives
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in the way it is used. With the dedicated support of those who must
implement it, a law can be the essential first step in the development
of a community network of prevention and treatment services. But to
do so, a law should be enacted only after the broadest possible
consultation with professionals and the general public and only
after an honest appraisal of the cost to implement it. Those affected
by the law have to be involved in its development if they are going to
accept the law and work to fulfill its provisions. Only in this way
can the essential community and financial support for the law be
found. Because implementation of the high-reaching goals of child
protective laws is the ultimate challenge, as a reminder to us all, the
Model Act provides: "There are hereby authorized to be appropriated
such sums as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this
Act. "318
But no law is the ultimate answer to child abuse and neglect. No
law can eradicate child abuse and neglect. No law can remedy its
underlying causes. The causes of child abuse and neglect are too
complex. Some stem from individual psychological problems; others
have roots deep in our social structure. A law may mandate the
treatment of parents, but it cannot rehabilitate them. Thus, no law
can wipe out child abuse and neglect. Though an improved law is a
necessary step, it is merely one of many steps that must be taken to
provide sufficient and suitable helping services for vulnerable
children and parents in need. A renewed sense of respect for the
human growth of all individuals within the context of the family will
do more to lower violence and aggression against the young than
any number of social agencies which usually become involved only
after the process of family breakdown has progressed almost past
the point of irremediable damage. Ultimately, the prevention and
treatment of child abuse and child neglect depend less on laws and
more on healthy family and community life.
318.

MODEL CHILD PROTECTION ACT

§ 28 (Aug. 1977 draft).
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